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Over the last years, the world’s increasing hunger for oil has forced oil companies to 
look for oil in deeper zones. Despite 
been made since the first well was 
and the extreme conditions of pressure and temperature at these depths increases the 
potential risk of an accident. However, this has not stopped the increasing number of 
platforms and oil companies searching for oil in deeper zones around the globe.
 
Map showing the Active Platforms in the US federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Gulf_Coast_Platforms.jpg
 
The Deepwater Horizon was a 
it was drilling an exploration well at the Mississippi Canyon Block 252, 
federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico. 
depth of 18,360 feet, was in the final stages of completion at t
occurred. The exploratory work 
already been requested from Minerals Management Service 
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INTRODUCTION 
the fact that many technological advances have 
first drilled, deepwater drilling is relatively r
 
modern ultra-deepwater semi-submersible rig. By 2010 
The well, which had been drilled to a final total 
he time the
had been deemed as “concluded” and permission had 
ecent 
 
 
 
in the U.S. 
 accident 
for temporary 
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abandonment of the well. The next planned job for the Deepwater Horizon, in the Nile 
Field on Viosca Knoll Block 914, was getting far behind schedule. 
 
At 21:49 on April 20th 2010, the rig suffered two consecutive explosions because of 
what is commonly known in the drilling industry as a “blowout”. The two explosions 
started a fire that lasted for more than 36 hours, until the rig sank in the Gulf waters, 
at a waterdepth of approximately 5,000 feet. Eleven rig workers were missing after the 
explosions and they were never found again. 
 
When the rig sank on April 22nd, oil started gushing out of the well, beginning the 
worst oil spill ever seen in US waters and in the Gulf of Mexico. After three months, 
with millions of dollars spent in attempts to seal the well and in oil recovery activities, 
and almost 5 million barrels of oil spilled, the well was finally capped and the spill was 
halted for the first time. On September 2010, a relief well was intersected in the 
blown-out well and cement was pumped downhole to “kill” it definitely. 
 
 
Location of the Deepwater Horizon, the approximate extent of oil and the oil found on coast 
http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-153348/This-map-depicts-the-location-of-the-Deepwater-
Horizon-oil 
 5 
The main purpose of this project is to describe the accident by analyzing what 
happened, why it happened and the main consequences. The project consists of an 
introduction to the platforms and drilling operations to make further explanations 
more comprehensible as well as a description of the drilling operations conducted, the 
subsequent accident and the actions taken to seal the Macondo well. These parts are 
followed by the analyses of the causes and consequences. The last part explains some 
proposals for improvement that may prevent such a disaster from happening again or, 
at least, reducing its probability. 
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PLATFORMS 
 
Platforms can be defined as facilities to work in the oceans, units of hydrocarbon 
exploration and exploitation or operational support, or loading and unloading or 
storage facilities, although they can have other different applications. The oceanic 
artefacts are really varied and they have special characteristics according to their 
functions. 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF OCEAN ARTEFACTS 
 
Ocean artefacts can be classified according to whether they are fixed platforms, 
mobile platforms, and special ships and facilities.  
 
Fixed platforms can be divided into:  
• Artificial Islands 
• Compliant Towers (Jacket) 
• Gravity Platforms 
• With an auxiliary boat 
• Tension-Leg Platforms 
• Spar Platforms 
• Articulated or swinging platforms 
• Underwater Stations 
 
Mobile platforms are usually divided between those that are supported on the seabed 
and the floating ones. Among those which are supported on the seabed, the following 
can be found: 
• Jack-up platforms 
• Submersibles 
• Articulated Catamarans 
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The main floating rigs are: 
• Semi-submersibles 
• Drill ships 
• Secured by cable platforms (deadweight anchor). 
 
Finally, among special ships and facilities the following can be found: 
• Specialized ships and barges 
• Supply vessels 
• Tankers 
• Loading and unloading terminals 
• Buoys 
• Underwater systems 
 
The three main types in terms of drilling are Jack-Up Platforms, Semi-submersible 
platforms and Drill Ships. The most important types used for exploitation and 
production are the Compliant Towers (Jacket) and the Gravity Platforms. 
 
FIXED PLATFORMS 
 
These platforms are used for the production of hydrocarbon products (production, 
processing, pumping), for staff accommodation, for storage or as a loading and 
unloading terminal. Here are a few of the different types of fixed platforms: 
 
− Compliant Towers (Jacket): They usually consist of a metal framework of tubes 
which form the structure and mounting piles on which the operating deck is 
located. They require a good foundation so they are designed to support 
significant lateral deflections and forces, and are typically used in water depths 
ranging from 1,500 and 3,000 feet (457 to 914 m). 
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- Gravity Platforms: They are supported on the seabed only by the force of 
gravity. They are usually built using a base manufactured from reinforced 
concrete with void spaces or caissons which are flooded once the platform is on 
location. The pioneer was the famous storage tank Ekofisk. 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliant Tower Petronius 
http://minyakdangasmalaysia.blogspot.com/2010/
10/part-ii-types-of-offshore-platforms.html 
 
Compliant Tower 
http://oilandgasprocessi
ng.blogspot.com/2009_0
2_01_archive.html 
 
Gravity Platform 
http://www.woodworkforums.com/f41/troll-oil-
platform-11148/ 
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− Deformable Platforms: they can support little deformations in their upper part 
resulting in fewer strains. The Spar Towers, which are anchored by giant cables, 
and The Tension-Leg Platforms (TLP), which are supported on the seabed, are 
the main ones. 
 
 
 
GravityPlatform 
Ingeniería Oceánica – Artefactos y Estructuras 
Navales  
Unidad didáctica I – Introducción – 
Oceanología Básica 
Por el Prof. Alejandro Mira Monerris- Escuela 
Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Navales de la 
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 
Devil's Spar Tower Oil Platform 
http://www.xingyimax.com/wiki/?title
=File:Devils_tower_2004.JPG 
 
Spar Tower 
http://www.shell.com/home/c
ontent/aboutshell/our_strate
gy/major_projects_2/perdid
o/assembling_deepest_platfo
rm/ 
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Shell Oil Company's Mars Tension Leg Platform 
 
http://www.oilrig-photos.com/picture/number90.asp 
 
 
Tension Leg Platform 
http://oilandgasprocessing.blogspot.com/2009_0
2_01_archive.html 
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MOBILE PLATFORMS 
 
Mobile platforms are those ready to move with relative ease to different places. 
Within this category many different platform types stand-out: 
 
a) Those supported on the seabed: 
− Jack-Up: it's the facility type that was first used for drilling operations in the 
Gulf of Mexico. They work in depths of 90 m and they don't have any 
propulsion system, so they move through towing in short distances or on 
heavy lift vessels when the travel is longer. During towing, their legs are 
elevated. Once in place their legs are lowered until they lay on the seabed. 
Afterwards, the platform is overloaded with ballast until the legs penetrate 
and become fixed on the seabed. Finally, the operating deck is elevated to 
the required height according to the wave’s height and the tide level. 
Jack-Up Oil Rig Ensco 100 
http://shipoftheday.blogspot.com/2007_10_
01_archive.html Jack-Up Platform 
Ingeniería Oceánica – Artefactos y Estructuras Navales  
Unidad didáctica I – Introducción – Oceanología Básica 
Por el Prof. Alejandro Mira Monerris - Escuela Técnica 
Superior de Ingenieros Navales de la Universidad 
Politécnica de Madrid 
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− Submersibles: they work in shallow waters (up to 30m), on soft seabed and 
concrete zones such as the Gulf of Mexico and Nigeria. They are composed 
basically of a lower hull from which vertical columns are elevated working 
to support the deck and act as stability columns while it is on the surface. 
The operational system of this unit is really simple: it floats to its operating 
position, then it floods its ballast tanks until it is supported on the seabed 
and from this point it develops its activity as if it were a fixed platform. They 
don't count on propulsion so they must be towed in short distances 
because its configuration gives her a large drag resistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submersible Platform 
http://convertiblearbitrage.net/
Offshore-Rigs.htm 
 
SubmersiblePlatform 
Ingeniería Oceánica – Artefactos y Estructuras Navales  
Unidad didáctica III – Diseño y Construcción 
Por el Prof. Alejandro Mira Monerris - Escuela Técnica Superior 
de Ingenieros Navales de la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 
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b) Floating platforms:  
− Semi-submersibles: these units can work anchored in depths of 450 m., 
reaching to 1850 m or even more if they have dynamic positioning which 
allows them to break free from classical anchorage. Generally they have 
their own propulsion system which gives a speed of 6 to 8 knots. Their 
configuration is similar to submersibles platforms. They have lower hulls 
with a number of columns that support the deck zone. However, their drag 
resistance is much less than that of the submersibles. Also, they can keep 
their operational characteristics even in harsh environmental conditions, 
such as those of the North Sea. Semi-submersible platforms are the ones 
which have experienced the greatest growth in recent years. When being 
operated, these platforms use the principle of important submerged 
volumes so that the winds above the waterline are minimal also becoming 
insensitive to waves' movement. The different platform positions are 
obtained by ballast; when the rig has to move the floats are de-ballasted 
until the platform gets a small draft; in operating position the floats are 
deeply submerged with a limited wind exposure; in waiting position 
(survival position), the wind exposure is more important. 
Semi-submersiblePlatform 
Ingeniería Oceánica – Artefactos y 
Estructuras Navales  
Unidad didáctica III – Diseño y 
Construcción 
Por el Prof. Alejandro Mira Monerris - 
Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros 
Navales de la Universidad Politécnica de 
Madrid 
 
Semi-submersible Platform Deepwater Horizon 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizon
_oil_spill?topic=50364 
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SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES 
 
SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE'S HISTORY 
 
The first semi-submersible appeared in 1962 and it was called “Ocean Driller”. Those 
units were developed based on the concept of stability by columns and they brought 
many technological advances, such as the BOP (Blow-Out Preventer) on the seabed, 
the improvement of the conductor pipe or “riser”, the position indicating equipment, 
the underwater television, the motion compensation equipment, etc. 
 
In 1965 the Mohole project financed by the US Government which intended to 
penetrate the Mohorovicic discontinuity, which separates the Earth's crust from the 
upper mantle, by means of a well of 10,000 m of depth under a water layer of 4,500 m, 
was created. To reach their aim a semi-submersible catamaran-typed platform that 
was never build but which established the groundwork for future projects was 
designed: self-propelled, dynamic positioning, hydrodynamic lower hulls, risers for 
ultra-deep waters. In the 60’s, the semi-submersible platforms had a displacement 
from 10,000 to 18,000 tons and they were slow and difficult to move on long trips. 
Their operational area was limited to the Gulf of Mexico where weather conditions 
were not too hard. Therefore, the supplying could be continuous, so they relied heavily 
on supply vessels and the storage of consumable materials was scarce. 
 
During the 70’s and the 80’s, new deposits in areas of harsh climatic conditions such as 
Alaska, the North American Atlantic coast and essentially the North Sea appeared. The 
size of the units grew substantially, reaching displacements of 40,000 tons. It was 
required more mobility to move to the different working areas, generalizing the 
configuration of two self-propelled hulls. Also, the environmental conditions prevented 
a continuous supply, so storing consumables not only on deck but also in the columns 
and the lower hulls was needed, thus gaining more autonomy.  The improvement of 
the anchorage system and the dynamic positioning first installed in 1976 allowed 
drilling in deeper waters. 
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As they are capable of providing a stable working platform and they can work for a 
long time regardless of the supply of the coastal base, they are used as floating 
production plants, floating cranes, fire-fighting units, pipe laying equipment, etc. 
 
Fixed platforms have two essential characteristics that limit their activities: they can't 
move and they have to be supported on the seabed. These limitations have led to the 
use of mobile platforms. Initially, fixed platforms were used to perform drilling and 
production operations in shallow waters because the cost was low. When the 
exploitation began to take place in deeper waters the costs raised dramatically, mainly 
because the platforms had to be supported on the seabed. The more complex the 
structure, the higher the fabrication cost. Besides, a detailed seabed study had to be 
done which, together with the installation difficulty in deep waters, increased the 
installation cost. Due to these reasons, fixed platforms don't work at great depths 
(Gravity Platforms about 150 m; Jacket Platforms about 300 m). 
 
The need for exploratory drilling and the increasing depth resulted in the appearance 
of mobile platforms. These could make many drills in different places searching for 
oilfields good enough to be exploited. The first mobile units used to work supported on 
the seabed, such as submersibles and Jack-up platforms. They have the advantages of 
a low cost manufacture and operation and the advantage of mobility, although it is 
very limited. However, their main drawback is that they can't work at great depths 
(Submersible platforms about 30 m deep and Jack-Up platforms about 90 m) so their 
use is limited to certain areas. 
 
To solve the problems of mobile platforms that worked as fixed platforms, floating 
platforms were developed. They had a greater mobility as most of them are self-
propelled and they have hydrodynamic forms, being drill ships those with more 
mobility. As they work while floating, they can drill at depths of 450 m with classical 
anchorage and 1850 m or more when using dynamic positioning. For the same reason, 
a detailed seabed study is not necessary, thus reducing the cost. However, the 
manufacture costs and the daily operational costs are higher than those of 
Submersible and Jack-Up Platforms. Moreover, their effective time of operation is less 
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than that of the platforms which work supported on the seabed, due to the response 
motions in front of external agents such as waves, winds or currents. 
 
MAIN CONFIGURATION 
 
Semisubmersibles are floating rigs with ballasting capabilities that allow them to float 
high during transport and partially submerge during drilling operations. Their structure 
basically consists of a deck suspended by columns over twin pontoons, which leave an 
open space for drilling called a “moon pool” below the rig floor. When the pontoons 
are submerged during drilling the stability of the whole rig improves as only the 
columns remain exposed to surface wave actions. 
 
A standard catamaran-typed floating platform is usually composed of the following 
parts:  
 
• Pontoons – They provide the necessary movement to keep the platform on the 
surface in every situation. Their dimensions are established according to the 
requirements of volume. They usually have a prismatic shape, almost 
rectangular for its ease of construction and its capacity of dragging to absorb 
the movements, with round-shaped edges to reduce the drag resistance. In the 
fore and aft area they are usually shaped to reduce drag during towing. 
 
• Columns - They are an essential and characteristic element of floating 
platforms. They accomplish structural functions supporting the upper hull but 
they have a special role in stability conditions and platform movement 
response. Once submerged, the columns define the floating area and its inertia 
moment, the metacentric radius. The bigger the radius, the better the stability. 
However, the own vertical oscillation frequency also depends on the floating 
area which must be smaller to get away from waves` frequencies, thus reducing 
the whole platform's stability. Using columns, the floating area can be reduced, 
as the inertia moment remains by distancing them from each other, this 
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preventing the stability from decreasing. Combining these two opposite effects 
the platform achieves enough stability (considering that the Gravity Centre is 
very high) with a good response when moving (essential characteristic of these 
platforms). 
 
• Bracings – They are tube-shaped elements that give rigidity to the whole 
platform. Their distribution is commonly simplified and their number tends to 
be reduced to ease the construction and avoid the fatigue phenomena which 
appear in the connections, area of great structural requirement. 
 
• Deck – It's the area where the equipment that defines the main purpose of the 
platform is placed. The equipment that usually stands out is the drilling tower, 
the accommodation, the machinery, the heliport, the cranes, etc. Despite 
initially semi-submersible platforms used to have one main deck, nowadays 
they are built with several twin decks. 
 
All the spaces are used to place equipment or store consumables or ballast water. It's 
common to place the propelling equipment, the ballast and fire-fighting pumps, the 
anchoring equipment, the fuel, water for drilling, ballast and fresh water in the 
pontoons; the mud and cement in the columns; the drilling tower, cranes, generators, 
accommodation, workshops, lifesaving equipment, pipes, etc, on the deck. 
 
All rigs have several basic systems: “rotating” equipment to turn drill pipe with a bit on 
the end; “hoisting” equipment to raise and lower pipe and tools in and out of the hole; 
“circulating” equipment to circulate drilling fluid (mud) through the wellbore during 
drilling; blowout prevention equipment and engines and generators to power all of 
these systems. Deepwater rigs also have a riser system to provide a sealed drilling 
conduit between the rig and the top of the well on the ocean floor. 
 
Semi-submersibles are usually towed to location but some count with self-propulsion 
over a limited range. Most semi-submersibles hold their position at the drillsite with 6 
to 12 mooring lines attached to spread anchors. However, the most advanced “5th 
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generation” semisubmersibles, as the Deepwater Horizon, use dynamic positioning 
systems. With these systems, multiple thrusters controlled by computer can keep the 
rig in place, making it easier to operate in ultra-deepwater and harsh environments.  
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Semi-SubmersiblePlatform 
Ingeniería Oceánica – Artefactos y Estructuras Navales  
Unidad didáctica III – Diseño y Construcción 
Por el Prof. Alejandro Mira Monerris - Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros Navales de la 
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 
 20 
RIG CREW 
 
An offshore rig like Deepwater Horizon is a drilling rig and a vessel at the same time. 
Therefore, the drilling contractor personnel must include drilling specialists as well as 
maritime specialists. These specialists live on the rig so there must also be staff to run 
the galley and maintain the accommodations. Following are some of the key positions 
on a large offshore rig:  
 
• Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) – The OIM is the most senior officer on 
the rig while drilling and is his responsibility to oversee all drilling operations, 
maintaining the rig, managing personnel and ensuring proper safety training 
and procedures. A big part of the OIM’s job is administrative and the OIM is the 
lead contact with the operator’s company man.  
 
• Toolpusher – Toolpusher is the person in charge of drilling operations. The Sr. 
Toolpusher usually works during the day, reports to the OIM and advises the 
Toolpusher, who works at night. The toolpushers have operational and 
administrative duties so they must split time between a desk and the rig floor. 
Administrative duties include filling reports, ordering supplies for the rig and 
managing personnel.  
 
• Driller – The Driller is the on-site supervisor that manages the drilling crew and 
directs all physical activity on and around the rig floor. The driller also operates 
the drilling controls, monitors data screens, completes well progress reports 
and enforces safety procedures. Besides, the driller is the one who reports to 
the Toolpusher.  
 
• Assistant Driller – Supports the driller and operates pipe handling equipment.  
 
• Pumphand, Floorhand(s) and Derrickhand – They work on the rig floor and 
around the mud equipment to do anything that must be done manually with 
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the instructions the Driller and Assistant Driller give them. They also clean the 
working area and assist the maintenance crew.  
 
• Crane Operator – The person who works in the crane tower operating the 
crane that moves supplies, equipment and people between support vessels and 
the rig and moves equipment on the rig floor as needed. The crane operator is 
supported by a “Roustabout” on the rig deck that secures and releases the 
crane cable as needed.  
 
• Mechanics/Motorman – Inspection, maintenance, repair, cleaning and 
lubrication of rig equipment and engines.  
 
• Electricians – Inspection, maintenance and repair of electronic equipment and 
systems. 
 
• Subsea Engineer – Inspection, maintenance, repair and monitoring of the 
blowout prevention equipment.  
 
• Master/ (Captain) – Responsible for overseeing maritime aspects of the vessel 
and is in charge during rig transport. Keeps the rig dynamically positioned 
during drilling.  
 
• Chief Mate – Responsible for deck maintenance, ballasting, load balancing and 
other marine integrity issues.  
 
Most of the positions require around-the-clock manning so most of the crew runs 12-
hour shifts or “tour” (pronounced “tower”). 30 minutes before each shift a pre-tour 
meeting takes place to inform about the progress and discuss the upcoming work plan. 
As the schedules are so hard, the crew does not have to stay for a long on the rig. In 
the case of the Deepwater Horizon, they spent 21 days on the rig and 21 days off.  
 
 22 
Quite a few personnel from supporting contractors are usually on the rig at any given 
point in time because they perform functions that are needed around the clock and 
they must work shifts as the rig crew usually does. Some of the personnel from 
supporting contractors are not needed continuously but they will stay on the rig until 
their duties are complete if it is cheaper for the operator to keep them on the rig 
instead of returning them to the shore. These contractors performing one-time or 
infrequent duties come and go as needed. 
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DEEPWATER HORIZON 
 
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig was a “5th generation” ultra-deepwater Semi-
Submersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) owned by Transocean. The rig was 
built for R&B Falcon by Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan, South Korea. The 
construction began in December 1998 when the rig was ordered and the keel was laid 
on March 21st 2000. It was finally delivered on February 23rd 2001, after the 
incorporation of R&B Falcon by Transocean.  
 
In 2002, the rig was equipped with “e-drill”, a drill monitoring system which allows 
technical personnel based in Houston, Texas, to receive real-time drilling data from the 
ring and to transmit maintenance and troubleshooting information. Deepwater 
Horizon was the second semi-submersible rig constructed of a class of two, although 
Deepwater Nautilus, its predecessor, is not dynamically positioned.  
 
Transocean operated the rig through its subsidiary Triton Asset Leasing GmbH and it 
was leased to BP on a 3 year contract for deployment in the Gulf of Mexico following 
construction which was renewed in 2004 for a year, in 2005 for 5 years and finally in 
2009 for a further 3 years covering 2010 – 2013. The latter contract was worth $544 
million, or $496,800 per day for 3 years, for the “bare rig”; with crew, gear and support 
vessels estimated to cost the same per day again. 
 
Deepwater Horizon was capable of working in water depths up to 8,000 feet and 
drilling to depths of up to 30,000 feet. It had operated on wells in the Atlantis (BP 56%, 
BHP Billiton 44%) and Thunder Horse (BP 75%, ExxonMobil 25%) oil fields. In 
September 2009, the rig drilled the deepest oil well in history at a vertical depth of 
35,050 ft (10,683 m) or more than six miles, below 4,132 ft (1,259 m) of water in the 
Tiber Oil Field at Keathley Canyon block 102. The well was the deepest oil well ever 
drilled in the world. 
 
  
 DEEPWATER HORIZON’S PARTICULARS
Name 
Deepwater 
Horizon
Owner 
Transocean’s 
Triton Asset 
Leasing GmbH
Operator Transocean 
Port of Registry 
 Marshall 
Islands
Call Sign V7HC9
IMO number 8764597
MMSI 538002213
Rig Type 5th Generation Deepwater 
Design Reading & Bates Falcon RBS
Builder Hyundai Heavy Industries Shipyard, Ulsan, South Korea 
Year Built 2001 
Classification ABS  
Cost US $560 
Class +A1, 
Accommodation 130 berths
Helideck Rated for S61
Moonpool 21 ft x 93 ft 
Station Keeping Dynamically Positioned 
Max Drill Depth 30,000 ft / 9,144 m 
Max Water Depth 8,000 ft / 2,438 
Operating 
Conditions 
Significant Wave: 29 ft;@ 10.1 sec; Wind: 60 knots; Current: 3.5 
knots 
Storm Conditions 
Significant Wave: 41 ft @ 15 sec; Wind: 103 knots; Current: 3.5 
knots 
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Technical Dimensions 
Length 396 ft   121 m   
Breadth 256 ft   78 m   
Air Draft 320 ft 97.4 m 
Depth 136 ft   41 m   
Operating Draft  76 ft   23 m   
Ocean Transit Draft 29 ft   9 m   
VDL – Operating 8,816 st   8,000 mt   
Tonnage 32,588 GT 9,776 NT 
Displacement 52,587 T 51,756 LT 57,967 ST 
Speed 4 knots 
Capacities 
Liquid Mud  4,435 bbls   24,900 ft3 705 m3 
Drill Water  13,076 bbls   73,415 ft3 2,078 m3 
Potable Water  7,456 bbls   41,862 ft3 1,185 m3 
Fuel Oil  27,855 bbls   156,392 ft3 4,426 m3 
Bulk Mud    13,625 ft3 386 m3 
Bulk Cement    8,175 ft3 231 m3   
Sack Material  10,000 sacks       
Drilling Equipment 
Derrick Dreco 242 ft x 48 ft x 48 ft, 2000 kips GNC   
Drawworks 
Hitec active heave compensating drawworks, 6,900 hp rated input 
power continuous, 2 in. drilling line   
Motion 
Compensator 
Hitec ASA Active Heave Compensator, 13.7 ft stroke, 500 st 
operating, 1,000 st locked   
Top Drive  Varco TDS-8S, 750 st, 1,150 hp with PH-100 pipe handler   
Rotary Varco RST, 60.5 in. opening, 1,000 st   
Pipe Handling 2 x Varco PRS-6i Pipe Packers; Varco AR-3200 Iron Roughneck  
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Mud Pumps 4 x Continental Emsco FC-2200, 7,500 psi   
Shale Shakers 7 x Brandt LCM-2D CS linear motion / cascading shakers   
Desander 2 x Brandt SRS-3 with 6 x 12 in. cones   
Desilter 
Brandt LCM-2D/LMC with 40 x 4 in. cones over one linear motion 
shaker, 2,400 gpm   
BOP 
2 x Cameron Type TL 18 ¾ in. 15K double preventers; 1 x Cameron 
Type TL 18 ¾ in. 15K single preventer; 1 x Cameron DWHC 18 ¾ in. 
15K wellhead connector   
LMRP 
2 x Cameron DL 18 ¾ in. 10K annular; 1 x Cameron HC 18 ¾ in. 10K 
connector   
Diverter 
Hydril 60 with 21 ¼ in. max bore size, 500 psi WP and 18 in. flowline 
and two outlets   
Control System Cameron Multiplex Control System   
Riser 
Vetco HMF-Classs H 21 in. OD riser; 90 ft long joints with C&K and 
booster and hydraulic supply lines   
Riser 
Tensioners 
6 x Hydralift Inline, 50f t stroke, 800 kips each   
Choke & Kill 
Stewart & Stevenson 3-1/16 in., 15K, with 2 x adjustable chokes 
and 2 x hydraulic power chokes   
Machinery 
Main Power  
6 x Wartsila 18V32 rated 9,775 hp each diesel engine, driving 6 x ABB 
AMG 0900xU10 7,000 kW 11,000 volts AC generators   
Emergency 
Power  
1 x Caterpillar 3408 DITA driving 1 x Caterpillar SR4 370 kW 480 volts 
AC generator   
Power 
Distribution 
8 x ABB Sami-Megastar Thrusters’ Drives, 5.5 MW and 6 x GE Drilling 
Drive Lineups 600 V 12 MW   
Deck Cranes 2 x Liebherr, 150 ft boom, 80 mt @ 35 ft   
Propulsion 8 x Kamewa rated 7375 hp each, fixed propeller, full 360 deg azimuth   
http://www.transoceanlawsuits.com/involved-parties/transocean/deepwater-horizon/ 
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Deepwater Nautilus, sister rig to the Deepwater Horizon being transported 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Deepwater_Nautilus.jpg
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OIL AND GAS BACKGROUND: 
 
OIL AND GAS FORMATION 
 
During the formation of marine areas such as, for instance, those near a river delta, 
organic debris mix with sediments while all of them accumulate on the ocean floor for 
centuries. If the water has a low level of oxygen and the sediments are the 
appropriate, the organic material won’t decompose and will be preserved over the 
years. The weight of the upper layers will compress the previous sediments into a rock 
called “shale”. The rising pressure from continuous burial and the increasing heat from 
sinking deeper into earth turns some of the organic material, which contains hydrogen 
and carbon, into oil and, if the pressure and heat is even higher, into gas. The 
hydrocarbons will completely turn into gas first if they get even deeper and, if this 
process continues, they will all finally be destroyed. 
 
 
Sedimentation and Transport Process 
http://www.madrimasd.org/blogs/universo/2008/08/15/98822 
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Sedimentary rock has microscopic pore spaces between rock grains which define the 
“porosity” of the material and connections between pore spaces which establish the 
“permeability”. These pore spaces are mainly full of water and, because of its higher 
density and the high pressure the layer is under, it causes oil and gas to move to the 
upper layers. However, shale has poor porosity and poor permeability, so an important 
part of the hydrocarbons remain stuck within this layer and don’t flow. 
 
 
Microscopic structure of shale, sandstone and limestone with water in pore spaces. 
http://www.classzone.com/books/earth_science/terc/content/investigations/es1401/es1401page04.cfm 
 
The oil and gas that escape from the shale layer continue flowing upward if the upper 
layer has a better porosity and permeability, as it happens for example with sandstone. 
These hydrocarbons cross as many layers as possible, until they find one with poor 
porosity and permeability. Then, they start moving laterally occupying all the pore 
space beneath the blocking layer until another trapping feature such as an anticline 
prevent the oil and gas from flowing definitely. The most attractive deposits for oil and 
gas companies are these formed in layers with good porosity and permeability as 
hydrocarbons have a higher concentration and flow better than in the shale layer, 
making possible for these companies to extract a greater quantity of product. 
 
 
 30 
 
Oil and Gas Anticline Reservoir 
http://www.isgs.uiuc.edu/maps-data-pub/publications/geobits/geobit9.shtml 
 
OIL AND GAS FORMATION: THE GULF OF MEXICO 
 
Thousands of years ago, land masses drifted apart and the ocean bathed the Gulf of 
Mexico for the first time. After centuries of repeated flooding and evaporation, a thick 
layer of salt was formed and covered much of the present deepwater leasing area. 
When the area became permanently submerged, this layer was covered by others that 
formed later. As salt has plastic qualities and is lighter than most sediment materials, 
the overburden of overlying layers sometimes cause the salt layer to warp and form 
structures called “diapirs” that pierce upward through weaker layers.  
 
The tight crystalline structure in salt makes a perfect impermeable seal for oil and gas 
and the salt warping can create a good surrounding trap feature. Despite most salt 
traps on land are found above or to the side of diapirs, some deepwater and ultra-
deepwater projects have successfully found oil and gas deposits beneath the salt layer. 
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When exploring for oil and gas beneath a salt layer at great depth, the difficulty 
increases because the seismic resolution through thick salt is poor and it makes 
difficult to figure out what is below the layer. Also, wellbore stability when drilling a 
well through a salt layer requires extra care to prevent the surrounding walls of the 
well from collapsing into it. 
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GULF OF MEXICO 
 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (MMS) AND LEASING ACTIVITY 
 
The area extending from the limit of the US states-owned submerged land, which 
extends 3 nautical miles from their coasts, to a point 200 nautical miles offshore, 
where international waters begin, is called the “Outer Continental Shelf” or “OCS”. This 
area and the overlying waters belong to the US federal government and is there where 
most of the offshore drilling activities take place.  
 
The OCS in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) has been one of the most active offshore drilling 
areas in the world for more than 50 years and only the North Sea has been currently 
capable of taking the Gulf of Mexico off the first place. The western and central 
sections of the GOM represent almost all of the US’s currently offshore oil and gas 
production.  
 
 
US Outer Continental Shelf 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Outer_Continental_Shelf_map.png?useFormat=mobile 
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The Minerals Management Service (MMS), which is part of the US Department of the 
Interior, is responsible for the federal offshore leasing. Leasing is a process by which a 
company obtains the use of a certain assets, in this case a fixed area in the Gulf of 
Mexico, for which it must pay a series of contractual, tax deductible, periodic 
payments. The lease holder is the receiver of the assets under the lease contract (oil 
and gas companies) and the lessor is the owner of the assets (the MMS representing 
the US federal government). 
 
By this method, oil and gas companies must not become the owner of the land to 
extract oil and gas from it. On the other hand, the US government doesn’t need to 
become an oil operator itself and it receives oil revenues without having to pay any 
share of exploration or development costs. 
 
The OCS in the Gulf of Mexico is divided into 29,000 lease “blocks” and just a selected 
group of these blocks are auctioned each year. Oil and gas companies submit sealed 
bids for the amount of up-front “bonus” they are willing to pay to obtain the lease. The 
MMS awards the lease to the highest bid provided that it is considerate to be 
appropriate.   
 
 
Mineral Management Service's logo 
http://www.oil-spill.com/tag/minerals-management-service/ 
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The “primary term” or evaluation phase of an awarded lease lasts between 5 and 7 
years maximum. During this first period of the lease, the leasing company must do 
annual “rental” payments to the MMS. After this time, if no production has resulted 
from the operations the MMS is free to re-auction the lease. On the contrary, if oil 
and/or gas production results from the drilling activities, the lease will go into a new 
phase that will last as long as the production does.  
 
When the leasing enters this new production phase, oil and gas companies must pay to 
the MMS a percentage of revenues called a “royalty”, which is currently 18.75%. The 
royalty provisions established in the leasing contract won’t change through the time 
the lease is valid, even if later changes are introduced for new leases. The offshore 
leasing activities have generated from 2005 to 2009 an average of $9 billion per year 
for the US government, which includes an annual average of $6.2 billion in royalties, 
$2.5 billion in lease bonuses and $0.2 billion in rentals. 
 
When leasing, the MMS is also responsible for issuing and enforcing regulations that 
govern offshore operations by collecting and reviewing data, issuing permits, 
conducting inspections, issuing fines and enforcing orders, requiring emergency 
training and issuing safety alerts to keep the industry informed. The MMS coordinates 
efforts with other US agencies, which include the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Fish and Wildlife Service, Coast Guard, Army Corps of Engineers, National Marine 
Fisheries Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to 
ensure that offshore activities are properly carried out. 
 
DEEPWATER PRODUCTION  
 
The activity in the deepwater area of the Gulf of Mexico has been continuously 
increasing since some royalty reductions were made in mid 90’s. By the time of the 
Deepwater Horizon’s accident, about 28% of active leases were in deepwater, which 
means at water depths between 1,500 feet (about 450 m) and 5,000 feet (about 1,520 
m), and 27% were in ultra-deepwater, which represents a depth over 5,000 feet.  
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Although deepwater projects sometimes take many years from the lease contract date 
to the beginning of production and they are extremely expensive, the recent 
discoveries in these depths have proved to be much more profitable than those in 
shallow waters. Currently, about the 80% of the Gulf of Mexico oil production and 40% 
of gas production comes from deepwater wells and it is said that these percentages 
will keep increasing.  
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DRILLING BACKGROUND 
 
DRILLING DEFINITIONS 
 
Previous to how drilling operations are carried out, some key words must be defined in 
order to make future explanations more understandable.  
 
• Drillstring –A Drillstring is a term used to define a long “string” of steel 
“drillpipe” with a bit at the end, which is used to drill a hole through 
underground formations by rotating it. As the hole gets deeper, more 
“drillpipe” is added.  
 
• Drilling Fluid or Mud – The “mud” is a fluid used during drilling to sweep rock 
cuttings out of the hole and its weight and viscosity help keeping high-pressure 
gas or fluids from entering into the wellbore. This drilling fluid, commonly 
known as “mud”, is pumped down through the centre of the drillpipe, out 
nozzles in the drill bit and back up to the surface where it is filtered, cleaned 
and re-circulated.  
 
•  Casing – Casing refers to a thickwalled steel pipe which is lowered into the hole 
after drilling has been stopped to seal off and protect the wellbore from 
collapsing. During casing placing, cement is pumped down that casing, out the 
bottom and up through the free space between the outside of the casing and 
the wellbore walls. Once the casing has cemented into place, the drilling can 
continue, although it would have a smaller diameter as the drill bit must be 
small enough to pass through the previous casing.  
 
• Wellhead–The wellhead is a thick steel receptacle installed on the top of the 
first section of casing, once this casing has been placed. During drilling, the 
wellhead is used to attach a “blowout preventer” and to hang off smaller 
strings of casing that will be installed as the well gets deeper; once the 
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production phase begins, a control-valve assembly called “tree” replaces the 
blowout preventer.  
 
• Blowout Preventer – The Blowout Preventer or “BOP” is a heavy-duty assembly 
with multiple closing devices capable of blocking off the well in the event that 
the mud and/or casing fail to adequately contain well pressure. 
 
• Riser – The “riser” is a steel pipe that connects the top of the BOP on the ocean 
floor with the rig at the surface. During drilling, it is filled with “mud” and 
provides a sealed conduit for drilling operations.  
 
• Completion – Completion is the last phase when drilling a well where oil and/or 
gas have been found. During this phase, production equipment such as 
“tubing” valves and flowlines are installed and the casing in the productive 
zone is perforated to allow hydrocarbons to flow into the well. 
 
WELL TARGET 
 
Depending on the main objective of the project, there can be distinguished different 
types of wells: 
 
• Exploration Well – An “evaluation well” is a term used when evaluating an 
untested prospect to determine the presence or non-presence of oil and/or 
gas. 
 
• Wildcat Well – When the presence of oil and gas is highly uncertain and the 
prospect is away from producing, the well will be referred to as a “wildcat 
well”. 
 
• Discovery – Is a term used when oil and/or gas is found in an appropriate 
quantity.  
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• Dry Hole – On the opposite, when a well shows no presence of oil and/or gas 
or, at least, not in an appropriate quantity, the well is commonly known as a 
“dry hole”. 
 
• Appraisal Wells – This kind of wells are drilled after the exploration wells and 
only if the prospect has proved to contain a large quantity of oil and/or gas. 
The main objective of these wells is to determine the size and quantity of the 
reservoir.  
 
• Development Wells – If the testing wells result in a potentially profitable 
discovery, some additional “development wells” are drilled in order to increase 
and maximize the production rate.   
 
• Reservoir – When a structure is determined to contain oil and/or gas is 
referred to as a “reservoir”. 
 
• Field – The term used to refer to a large reservoir or a group of small reservoirs 
is a “field”. 
 
• Reserves – The “reserves” are the estimated quantity to be recoverable from 
an oil and/or gas reservoir. 
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THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
Oil and gas companies usually work together on projects and share “joint working 
interests” when acquiring a lease to explore for and produce oil and gas, mainly to 
diversify risk in high-cost areas. The joint working interest partners for the Macondo 
block (Mississippi Canyon Block 252 lease) are BP (65%), Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation (25%) and a subsidiary of the Japanese company Mitsui, MOEX Offshore 
2007 (10%). 
 
The oil and gas companies sharing joint working interests sign a “JOA” or “Joint 
Operating Agreement” that establishes how the joint interest will be managed, what 
are the rights and obligations for each party and designates one of these parties as the 
“operator”. In the case of the Macondo well, British Petroleum (BP) was the one 
designated as the “operator”. 
 
Normally, the operator controls the entire project including the design of the well or 
wells, facilities needed and any changes required during drilling; selection and 
procurement of all supplies, services and equipment; filling all permits and complying 
with laws and regulations; providing the appropriate personnel for each stage of the 
project and any other activities required to complete and operate the project. The 
operator is also responsible for incurring all costs of the project and billing the non-
operating partners for their share.   
 
One of the many tasks of the JOA is to calculate by means of formulas a monthly 
payment to be made by the non-operators to the operator for reimbursement of the 
operator’s internal overheads. These formulas are usually linked to activity levels and 
there is a provision for catastrophe-related overheads, stated as a percentage of 
catastrophe costs.  
 
Depending on the type of JOA, the non-operating partners’ level of knowledge about 
the project can be much different. A JOA for a non-US project usually establishes an 
“operating committee” with a representative from each party that discusses operating 
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plans and budgets and meets at least every year. Moreover, the operator must 
circulate an “Authorization for Expenditure” or “AFE” when dealing with certain types 
of expenditures or expenditures over certain threshold amounts. This form determines 
the work to be done, the cost to be incurred and the expected results and it must be 
approved by the number of partners and/or the percentage of the interests 
established in the JOA before the operator can proceed. 
 
On the other side, US JOAs do not establish an “operating committee” and partners do 
most of their formal communication through AFEs. Despite this, when dealing with 
highly risky or complicated projects, as it seemed to be the Macondo Well, there 
usually is a considerable amount of informal communication and data exchange 
between the partners. 
 
JOAs usually state that the operator must run the project “reasonably prudent”, in a 
good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with 
good oilfield practice and in compliance with applicable law and regulation. Therefore, 
if losses or liabilities sustained don’t result from gross negligence or wilful misconduct, 
the operator will not be responsible for them to the other joint interest owners. In 
case there’s a suspicion of gross negligence or wilful misconduct, non-operators must 
continue making payments under the JOA until the matter can be resolved between 
the joint interest holders or, if it cannot be possible, settled in arbitration or ruled by a 
court of law, which takes many years of proceedings and appeals. 
 
WELL DESIGN 
 
The well proposal for a drilling project is made within the operator’s organization and 
comes from the exploration department, in case it is of an exploration well, or from 
the operations department, when dealing with a development well. In both cases, the 
proposal made to the drilling engineers must include information such as where the 
well should be started, where to penetrate the known reservoir or prospect, the 
required width of the hole and any known characteristics of formations, temperatures 
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and pressures expected, the type and rate of production and the planned method of 
completion and production. 
 
Despite the perfect idea of a well would be one with an equal diameter all the way to 
the target, wells have to be sealed off at determined intervals, which depend on the 
depth of the well and the formation conditions at each depth. Every change in 
diameter is called a “hole section” and they are 2 to 4 inches narrower than the 
previous one. Deep and complicated wells such as the one in the Macondo prospect 
can have several hole sections and even deviated or horizontal sections in order to get 
safely and easier to the target.  
 
The first hole section, which is commonly known as the “surface hole”, is drilled short 
with the aim to protect the wellbore from surrounding shallow aquifers and to place as 
quick as possible the wellhead to attach the blowout preventer at the top and have the 
main protection against high pressures that can be encountered downhole installed 
before drilling further. 
 
Underground formations contain pressure, called “pore pressure”, and it increases as 
the well gets deeper because of the growing weight. Therefore, mud weight must be 
also increased accordingly to prevent the gas and fluids from entering into the 
wellbore. Simultaneously, the formation can take a limit of mud pressure which before 
it starts fracturing and yields to the mud. This maximum pressure is known as the 
“fracture gradient” and if exceeded can cause the loss of the mud into the formation.  
 
The mud must have the appropriate weight in order to avoid be lost into formation 
because of the fracture gradient and also protect the gas and fluids from invading into 
the hole because of the pore pressure. Therefore, it is said that the weight pressure of 
mud gives rock strength and it is related to the “fracture gradient” and the “pore 
pressure” of the formation. Drilling engineers must take into account that as the well 
gets deeper both the fracture gradient and the pore pressure increase and so must do 
the mud weight. 
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In some occasions, the mud weight required to contain the pore pressure at the 
bottom of the well when drilling can be so high that it exceeds the fracture gradient of 
the uphole formations and causes lost mud circulation. The well design must detail 
when that will occur and establish casing points where the well must be sealed off to 
continue without problem. There also other factors that must be taken into 
consideration. For instance, some formations have anomalous pore pressure and/or 
fracture gradient for their depth; in some sections the pore pressure and the fracture 
gradient can be too close and will require placing another string of casing quickly after 
the previous one; and even some formations cannot be left uncased for long as they 
tend to swell and crumble into the wellbore. 
 
When designing an exploration well penetrating the target for the first time, there is 
no available information to estimate relevant factors from the underground 
formations. However, there had been two shallow wells previously drilled on the 
Mississippi Canyon Block 252 that provided data of the shallower zones and BP could 
have collected data from their prior deepwater drilling in the area. Moreover, despite 
being less-defined sources, seismic maps could have given a lot of information. 
However, it is appropriate when designing such a well to build a considerable margin 
of safety to compensate the unknown factors that can occur during drilling.    
 
The previous and essential step to the well design is determining the bottom-hole 
diameter as it must be large enough to accommodate tubing sized for the expected 
production rate plus any tools or pumps that will be needed downhole during well’s 
life. Therefore, the well design usually begins from the bottom up because drilling 
engineers have to deliver a bottom-hole diameter as specified in the well proposal, 
which was 9 7/8” for the Macondo well. 
 
Afterwards, engineers start working backwards determining each appropriate casing 
interval and increasing the hole size with each higher section. Finally, subsea wells are 
usually designed to fit industry equipment standards about top casing size, which is 
commonly an 18 – ¾” maximum wellhead size. Once the top and bottom parameters 
have been established, engineers determine the proper hole and casing sizes for the 
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sections in between, taking into account that during drilling maybe some additional 
casing strings are required. Finally, the final well design must detail the width and 
depth of each planned section, the diameter and number of casing that will be used, 
the position of the casing and the intervals that will be cemented. 
 
The terms “surface casing” and “production casing” stand for the first or top section 
and the bottom or last section to be placed, respectively. The rest of the sections to be 
placed in between the previous ones are called “intermediate” casing. Casing can be 
hung from the wellhead to the bottom, which is called a “long string”, or it may be 
hung downhole from the inside of a prior casing string and cover only the most-
recently drilled section, which is called a “liner”. In some occasions, “liners” can be 
used for any intermediate and/or production casing strings instead of “long strings” as 
they are cheaper and faster to install. However, the final production casing string is 
often referred to as a “production liner”, even if it runs all the way to the wellhead or it 
does not.   
 
The surface casing in a well must be completely sealed off and anchored with cement 
along the full length and intermediate sections can be cemented to varying levels from 
bottom to top, depending on the operator’s judgement. Some open wellbore sections 
are greatly stable and do not need to be cemented completely and some may need to 
Therefore, it is very important to specify casing and liner cementing intervals in the 
well design. Some sections of a well are greatly unstable and may need to be 
completely sealed off with cement while, on the contrary, others may not need to be 
fully cemented. When a complete seal is need cement is pumped up to the liner top 
and partially into the overlap with the prior casing string.  
 
WELL PLAN 
 
Once the well design has been completely finished and revised, a well plan is created 
to determine the list and schedule of all the required procedures, permits, equipment, 
materials, supplies and support services needed before, during and after drilling. 
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Before starting the drilling process, a lot of work such as a seafloor survey, reports 
filling and permits obtaining must be carried out.  
 
In addition, a rig and all of the planned support contractors must be hired and 
coordinated; equipment, materials and supplies must be ordered and delivery 
coordinated; boat and helicopter transport to and from the rig must be arranged. Most 
of the planned activities must be flexible in terms of time as each stage on the well 
plan usually depends on the completion of the previous task and each one can be 
performed by a different support contractor.  
 
CONTRACTORS 
 
During the full time a lease is valid, several independent contractors and suppliers are 
required by oil and gas companies to provide with the needed materials and services. 
During drilling, the required contractors may consist of a drilling rig contractor, mud 
services provider, casing installation contractor, cementing contractor, directional 
drilling services contractor, transportation contractors, wireline-logging contractor and 
remotely operated vehicle (ROV) contractor among others.  
 
The operator only places 1 or 2 representatives on site to supervise the well, which are 
commonly called the “Company Man” or the “Wellsite Leader”. They are responsible 
for making sure the well plan is followed properly and addressing any key issues that 
may arise and approving any deviations that need to be made. Despite the “Wellsite 
Leader” has a lot of authority on the rig, he/she does not usually have high authority 
within the operator’s organization so many decisions and instructions come from the 
onshore operator’s drilling office. On board the Deepwater Horizon there were two 
company men working shifts.  
 
In the specific case of the Macondo Prospect, BP hired different companies to fulfil a 
particular task in the project. Among all the many different contractors, there can be 
highlighted the hiring of Transocean as the drilling contractor, Weatherford 
International for the casing installation, Halliburton for cementing services and 
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directional drilling support, Schlumberger for wireline logging, M-I-SWACO for mud 
services and Dril-Quip as the wellhead and installation support supplier  
 
In most of the drilling projects and the Macondo well wasn’t an exception, the contract 
between operator and contractors includes a mutual indemnity provision called a 
“knock for knock” clause, which states that each party is responsible for any losses to 
their own equipment and personnel while on the drill site, regardless of fault, and the 
operator is responsible for any pollution and consequential damages from the well. 
Likewise, one party must indemnify the other if it has been incurred any costs or claims 
that were the agreed responsibility of the first. 
 
Despite all this, knock-for-knock clauses commonly include a provision that the 
indemnity does not apply to any losses or liabilities resulting from the gross negligence 
or wilful misconduct of either the operator or contractors. Therefore, if any of the 
operator or the contractors is found to have been guilty of gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct, the other party may have a way to seek loss recoveries if it’s the case of a 
contractor or to seek recovery for spill containment and clean-up costs plus potentially 
the loss of the well and damage to the reservoir if it’s the case of the operator, from 
the guilty one.  
 
RIG CONTRACT 
 
Most offshore rigs are hired by the operator under a “daywork” contract as it was the 
case of the Deepwater Horizon. A “daywork” contract means the operator must pay 
the rig contractor an agreed rate per 24 hours for providing not only the rig and crew, 
but also the riser, the drillpipe and the blowout preventer, among others. The rig crew 
performs the work requested by the operator but is not responsible for the rate of 
progress or final outcome of the well. The operator also pays for certain rig operating 
supplies and pays for all third-party supplies, equipment rentals and contract services 
used for the well. The total daily cost of the rig, which doesn’t include capital 
equipment such as cement and casing, is called the “spread rate” and it was supposed 
to be as much as $1 million per day. 
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In certain occasions, some rig rate adjustments are applied as, for instance, a “repair 
rate” when the rig has to stop operations to perform repairs of its own equipment. In 
this case, the operator will continue paying the dayrate if the required repairs only 
take a few hours but if repairs need a higher amount of time, the rig dayrate may be 
suspended until the rig has not properly been repaired. Other examples of these 
adjustments are the mobilisation and demobilisation rate that is paid during rig moves 
or, in case of a long-term contract, a “standby” rate that is applied if the rig is idle 
between jobs.  
 
Despite the operator directs the well, the rig contractor also has key responsibility for 
well control as they maintain the blowout prevention equipment, perform or assist 
with most procedures and operate drilling controls, which include conducting BOP 
tests and inspections. The drilling contractor’s responsibility is to monitor well 
conditions with particular attention to inflows versus outflows to detect any sign of 
mud loss or back pressure, which can lead to a commonly known as a “kick” or too 
strong backflow.  
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THE MACONDO WELL DRILLING 
 
The Macondo Prospect was on the Mississippi Canyon Block 252, abbreviated MC252, 
which is a 5,760-acre block (aprox. 2,330 hectares) 41 miles off the southeast coast of 
Louisiana at a water depth of about 5,000 feet. BP had acquired in March 2008 the 
lease of this block in the Minerals Management Service (MMS) lease sale #206 by 
offering a bonus of $34 million. 
 
 
Macondo Well's location 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
 
Almost a year later, in February 2009, BP presented an “Initial Exploration Plan” to the 
MMS for drilling two exploration wells to search for oil, which had to be drilled by the 
Marianas, a semisubmersible drilling rig owned by Transocean. This plan presented by 
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BP, which stated that a spill associated with a blowout was unlikely, was approved by 
the MMS on April 6th 2009. On May 22nd 2009, an Application for Permit to Drill was 
approved by MMS.  
 
The internal well plan prepared in September 2009 by BP for the first well or 
“Macondo Prospect” stated that the drilling would reach a total depth of 19,650 feet. 
This first well had to objectives to test: one at 13,319 feet below the ocean floor and a 
second near the well bottom. 
 
 
Geology, Original Well and Initial Exploratory Plan for the Macondo Prospect 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
 
36’’ AND 28’’ CONDUCTOR PIPES 
 
On the October 6th 2009, the Transocean’s Marianas semi-submersible rig began 
drilling the Macondo Prospect. The first stage on the drilling process was to insert a 
thick-walled 36’’ conductor pipe to line the top part of the well and, at the meantime, 
to prevent the topmost layer, which is commonly formed of mud, from falling into the 
hole. In addition, a wellhead housing is installed on top of this conductor pipe to serve 
as a protecting positioning base for the wellhead, which is installed later. 
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The 36’’ conductor pipe is usually “jetted” into the thick layer of mud by pumping 
seawater through ports in the bit, which slightly protrudes from the bottom of the 
pipe. By pumping seawater under high pressure, the mud is swept away and the pipe 
can sink to the targeted depth of 254 feet. After a few hours, the mud will settle back 
again around the pipe holding it firmly placed on its position. 
 
Once the first 36’’ conductor pipe had been “jetted” into the top mud layer, drilling 
started. The 28’’ second conductor pipe was installed at a depth of 1,150 feet below 
the ocean floor to give a more solid support to the wellhead and to prevent some 
shallow aquifers from causing any problem to the wellbore. During drilling, seawater is 
pumped through the bit under high pressure to take cuttings off the wellbore and 
throw them on the ocean floor. 
 
Unlike the first conductor pipe, the 28’’ conductor pipe was to be cemented on place 
and therefore the hole was drilled by a 26’’drill bit and a 32-1/2’’ widener following the 
bit. By drilling the hole section wider than the pipe diameter, an empty space was left 
for the cement outside of the conductor pipe and the wellbore walls. 
 
 
Diagram of drilling the hole for the 28’’ Conductor Pipe 
The Macondo Well 
Part 3 in a Series about the Macondo Well (Deepwater Horizon) Blowout 
By Paul Parsons – July 15, 2010 
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The 28’’ conductor pipe was lowered into the hole with a “guide shoe” on the bottom 
with rounded edges that prevented the pipes edges from catching on the sides of the 
hole. This guide shoe also counted with several ports to allow the seawater to flow 
through the pipe as it was lowered and, after it was placed, to pump cement through 
during the cementing process. To keep the pipe centred during and after its lowering 
and ensure an even flow of cement around the pipe, bowspring devices called 
“centralizers” were installed around the outside of the pipe to force it away from the 
wellbore walls. 
When lowering a section of pipe that must be cemented, this pipe is equipped with a 
float collar, which has a hole in the centre covered by a one-way flap valve. During the 
lowering of the pipe, this vale is locked open in order to allow fluid to flow through the 
pipe. When the cementing begins, this flap is unlocked in order to allow cement to 
flow out of the pipe and up the annular space but preventing it from going back once 
the pumping stops. To convert the locking mechanism, a ball is pumped through the 
float collar and shears the pin which holds the flap open. In the case of the Macondo 
well, double flap valves were used and the ball was caged in the float collar instead of 
being dropping through the drillstring.  
Another important step before cementing is to circulate seawater to clean out the hole 
so all cuttings and debris which could block the float collar are properly removed. To 
make sure that there is no debris in the casing, it is a good industry practice to 
circulate at least one casing/conductor pipe volume. Moreover, to thoroughly remove 
gas, cuttings and debris that may be into the wellbore, it is also appropriate to 
circulate at least one “bottoms-up”, which means to circulate fluid at the bottom of 
the hole out. 
 
CEMENTING 
 
The cementing process is similar for every section that needs to be cemented during 
the project. To begin with, a control device called a “cement head” is attached to the 
top of the drillstring on the rig and a cement line and a seawater line are attached to 
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the “cement head” to be able to switch between cement or seawater flow. Once the 
clean out of the hole is finished, the cement pumping begins and a “bottom plug dart” 
is released from cementing head ahead of the cement.  
 
The release of the “bottom plug” is triggered when the dart reaches the cement plug 
tool. The bottom plug pushes the seawater out of the casing as it is lowered, thus 
preventing the cement from being contaminated. At the end of the cement a “top plug 
dart” is placed and released from the cementing head and, after this, seawater 
pumping begins. The “top plug” release is also triggered when the dart reaches the 
cement plug tool and it prevents the seawater from contaminating the uphole end of 
the cement.  
 
When the bottom plug reaches the float collar, a rubber membrane in the plug breaks 
and lets the cement to flow out of the casing occupying the empty space between the 
outside of the casing and the wellbore walls while the plug remains in the collar. Due 
to the continuous pumping of seawater, the cement will continue to flow and at some 
time the top plug will land on the float collar blocking any further flow. This stage in 
the cementing process is called “bumping the plug”. The next step in this process is to 
let the cement harden, commonly known as “waiting on cement” or “WOC”.  
 
On certain sections of the well, the volume of cement pumped does not reach all the 
way up to the mudline. In other sections by the time the plug bumps, the top of the 
cement has already reached the top of the well as it was the case of this 28’’ conductor 
pipe. Some of the cement is left after the cement job between the shoe and the float 
collar in a space called the “shoe track”, which can be as much as 50 to 200 feet long. 
Both the plugs, the float collar and guide shoe are all non-metallic so the bit can drill 
them and the cement when going deeper.  
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22’’ CASING 
 
During drilling this section, seawater was also used as drilling fluid and cuttings were 
thrown out of the hole on the ocean floor. The section was drilled with a 26’’-wide bit 
but the diameter of the pipe for this section was only 22’’. As this section was 
considered to be the first section of “casing” it is referred to as the “surface casing”. 
 
A wellhead was welded on the top of this section pipe and it had a locking mechanism 
that locked into position in the wellhead housing, which had been previously placed on 
top of the well. After placing the wellhead, every pipe or equipment required to go 
inside the well was required not to be wider than the inner diameter of the wellhead, 
which was 18.51’’. Two “supplemental hanger adapters” were also installed into the 
22’’ casing string to hang off the 18’’ and 16’’ casing strings when these sections were 
drilled.  
 
Once the 22’’ casing string was cemented back to the mudline like the previous 28’’ 
conductor string and the wellhead was properly locked on top of this casing string, the 
Blowout Preventer (BOP) was lowered down on the bottom of the riser pipe and 
attached to the top of the wellhead. By connecting the riser and the BOP, there is a 
sealed connection between the rig and the well which allows the use of the mud 
instead of the seawater. Controlling and monitoring the well is even more important 
since this stage of the project because any blowout uncontrolled could reach the rig 
and cause the disaster that happened with the Deepwater Horizon.   
 
MUD 
 
To remove cuttings from the hole when drilling, a drilling fluid is pumped through the 
drill string under high pressure and exits from nozzles in the bit. Once the fluid is back 
to the rig, it is properly filtered and re-circulated. The fluid used in the Macondo well 
was synthetic oil based mud (SOBM). The mud usually contains some chemical 
additives to control mud characteristics, which must be changed as underground 
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formations also change. This specific SOBM used in the Macondo well has high lubricity 
for the drill string, tolerance of high temperatures and a reduced reaction to certain 
types of formations such as salt and shale.  
 
The most significant of mud’s functions is to cool and lubricate the drill string and bit 
and counter formation pressure downhole caused by oil, gas or water which could 
invade the wellbore and lead to a blowout. Mud also deposits a protective coating on 
the wellbore walls commonly known as “filter cake”, which reduces formation 
crumbling into the hole and prevents the mud from being lost into surrounding 
formations. Some additional motors can also be powered by mud.  
 
The mud weight is usually expressed as pounds per gallon (ppg) and as reference, fresh 
water weighs 8.3 ppg. In the case of the Macondo well, mud weight began at 9.7 and 
increased as the well was getting deeper until it reached 14.0 ppg at the bottom. In 
some occasions, the drilling fluid that is being used is lost in the formation instead of 
flowing up the annulus and it is referred to as “Lost Circulation”. 
 
Once drilling fluid has entered the formation, the fluid levels in the wellbore will 
decrease and consequently the hydrostatic pressure will drop too, thus allowing 
hydrocarbons to enter the borehole and flow up the formation casing or casing 
annulus, increasing the risk of a blowout. When it is not possible to avoid mud losses 
due to weak, highly-porous or fractured formations, some additives known as “Lost 
Circulation Material” or “LCM” are added to the mud to seal this specific zone.  
 
RISER 
 
The main function of the riser is to serve as a sealed connection between the rig and 
the well for the mud and a guide for the pipe and tools used in the hole. The inner 
diameter of the riser is usually 21’’ and is coated with thick buoyant material to 
minimize the effect of its weight on the platform.  
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Outside the riser, four lines run all the way from the rig to the top of the BOP. One of 
these lines is a set of high-pressure hydraulic lines that powers the BOP. Another line is 
a “booster” line that drives the mud back to the rig. The remaining two lines are 
“choke” and “kill” lines that connect to the BOP and allow fluids to be circulated in and 
out the well when the BOP is closed as, for instance, during some pressure tests. 
 
BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)  
 
The blowout preventer or BOP is a stacked arrangement of closing devices that in the 
event that hydrocarbons enter the wellbore, which is commonly known as a “kick,  can 
close completely the well. This essential piece in the project is usually designed to 
handle pressures up to 15,000 psi. 
 
When a “kick” occurs, the first response must be to increase the mud weight to try to 
resist against the incoming flow. The BOP must only be used as the last chance to 
prevent a blowout if it is reported to be too rough. To stop the flow from the well to 
the rig, the BOP has annular preventers, pipe rams and shear rams, and they will be 
used depending on the magnitude of the kick as well as whether there is anything 
passing through the BOP at this certain moment such as drillpipe or casing. 
 
The most frequently used because of their smoothness when operating are the 
annular preventers. They usually consist of a steel-reinforced rubber donut-shaped 
seal that closes around any pipe when compressed, thus sealing the well. The main 
advantage of these devices is that when they are engaged, drillpipe or casing can still 
be raised or lowered, although not without difficulty. This is commonly known as 
“stripping”. However, annular preventers can also completely seal off the hole if no 
pipe is present although it is not the strongest and, therefore, most recommended 
device for that situation. The Deepwater Horizon had two of these annular preventers.  
 
The second choice to stop a kick from getting to the rig at the surface is pipe rams. 
These devices consist of metal bars with half circles cut out of the ends that clamp 
around the pipe and seal off the full wellbore annulus space left. When this device is 
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activated the pipe cannot move from its position because of the flared ends of the drill 
pipe, which cannot pass through. Deepwater Horizon had two pipe rams with heavy 
elastomer edges that could seal around different sizes of drill pipe, which are called 
“variable bore” pipe rams.  
 
The last option to seal off the well with the BOP is by using the blind shear rams, which 
can cut through any drillpipe or casing that is passing through the BOP when the rams 
are closed. Cutting drillpipe or casing because of the action of blind shear rams can 
ruin the whole project in the worst case scenario and therefore this is why blind shear 
rams are always used as the last chance to stop a kick. Deepwater Horizon’s BOP had 
two blind shear rams, one for drillipipe and another for casing.  
 
As per BP request and cost, in 2004 the Deepwater Horizon converted what had 
previously been a pipe ram into a test ram, despite Transocean advised BP this could 
decrease the BOP effectiveness. This test ram consists basically of a pipe ram inverted 
thus making it seal off pressure coming from above the ram rather than from the well 
below. Without this device, a plug needs to be placed at the bottom of the BOP and 
remove the entire pipe from the hole to perform a BOP pressure test. By adding this 
test ram the test can be done easier because pipe can remain in the hole. 
 
An electrical control line connects the BOP with the two control panels used to operate 
this item from the rig, one placed on the rig floor close to the Driller and Toolpusher 
and the other on the bridge close to the Offshore Installation Manager and the 
Captain. There are two pods on the BOP, the yellow and the blue pod, controlled by 
the rig control panels which can activate hydraulic valves that channel hydraulic 
pressure coming from a hydraulic line on the riser to open or close the BOP devices. In 
case of emergency, there exist “accumulator” bottles that store enough pressure to 
close all valves just once. 
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Deepwater Horizon's BOP diagram 
Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG) - March 2011 
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSGFinalReport-March2011-tag.pdf 
 
In the event of an emergency, an Emergency Disconnect System, or EDS, can be 
activated on the control panels to disconnect the two separable sections of the BOP, 
the top section which is called the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) that connects 
to the riser and the BOP stack that connects to the wellhead on the bottom. At the 
meantime, the EDS activates the blind shear ram in the BOP and the annular 
preventers in the LMRP to seal off the well completely and prevent any mud coming 
from the riser to spill to the ocean. Moreover, there exists a deadman switch called the 
“Automatic Mode Function” or “AMF” which activate the blind shear rams in case both 
hydraulic pressure and electrical communication with the rig are lost. This device does 
not separate the LMRP from the BOP. 
 
When all or parts of the BOP are closed, there are two different lines with their 
respective valves that allow access to the well. The “choke line” and choke valves are 
used to release pressure from the well conducting the backflow to special equipment 
on the rig including a “gas buster” vessel, which can safely handle mud mixed with gas. 
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The “kill line” and kill valves are used to pump heavy mud in the well to stop the 
backflow. However, they are often used to carry out many other different tasks such as 
pressure tests on casing, set seals, activate tools, etc.  
 
DIVERTER 
 
A diverter is a device installed at the top of the riser on the rig to also perform 
pressure-control and activate in case gas or dangerous flow levels of fluid enter the 
riser before the BOP is closed or in case it doesn’t closed. The diverter closes around 
the drillpipe in case any is in the hole and directs flow through a “blooey line” to one of 
the booms that extend over the side of the rig on opposite sides, so that downwind is 
always available. Normally, each boom has an ignition source to burn diverted gas. 
 
Diverters only have approximately 500 pound pressure capacity so they can be 
surpassed by extreme flow as it usually happens when hydrocarbons enter in the riser. 
Deepwater extreme pressures cause gas to be liquefied. However, when this gas 
enters in the riser, the pressure decreases and gas expands forcing the fluid above to 
jet violently ahead, up through the drill floor and into the mud processing equipment 
and eventually both gas and fluid will burst once on the rig.  
 
18’’ LINER 
 
The 18’’ hole section was drilled by an 18-1/8’’ bit followed by a 22’’ reamer and it was 
the first section of the Macondo Prospect to be drilled with mud instead of seawater. A 
reamer is a tool placed following the bit that further widens the hole and the one used 
in the Macondo well is called an “underreamer”. This specific reamer can be expanded 
and contracted in order to pass through the previous 22’’ casing, which had an inner 
diameter of about 20’’.  
 
This 18’’ casing was a “liner” hung from a position downhole and was not cemented all 
the way up to the mudline but only partially. It also had a “casing hanger” attached on 
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the top to suspend this casing from the 18’’ supplemental hanger adapter preinstalled 
in the 22’’ casing. The casing hanger had a seal assembly that was set on place once 
the cement has settled and the mud displaced had escaped through the ports in the 
casing hanger. The seal assembly is set into place by placing the weight of the 
drillstring on a special running tool. This strong seal prevents any future inflow or 
outflow that could affect the well.  
 
Despite BP’s well plan established this section was to be drilled 2,000 feet, it was only 
drilled 1,032 feet because of lost-circulation problems, which justify the short length of 
this 18’’ section in order to avoid additional problems. The Transocean Marianas rig 
experimented problems with their BOP while setting the 18’’ liner. In order to perform 
the necessary repairs they unlatched the BOP and pulled it to the rig.  
 
However, while undergoing BOP repairs the Hurricane Ida passed nearby and the rig 
subsequently experienced electrical problems, which led to the discovery of electrical 
wiring damage. The well was secured; the rig was disconnected and finally taken to a 
shipyard for repairs on the 26th of November 2009. At that point, of the planned total 
14,569 feet below the ocean floor, only 3,900 were already drilled.  
 
DEEPWATER HORIZON 
 
The Deepwater was the rig chosen to replace the Marianas in the Macondo Prospect. 
On the 14th of January 2010 the MMS approved an Application for Revised New Well 
and the Macondo plan was updated according to the replacement of the Marianas by 
the Deepwater Horizon, which arrived to the drilling site on January 31st 2010. After 
few days of set-up, the Deepwater Horizon resumed drilling on 6th February 2010. 
 
Later on that month, a leak was discovered on the yellow pod of the BOP but, 
according to BP, its impact was reduced by switching to the blue pod, which was later 
discovered not to have charge enough on the battery bank. Failures in both the yellow 
and blue pods implied that in the event of an emergency the BOP could not be 
activated.  
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16’’ CASING 
 
The 16’’ section was drilled with a 16-1/2’’ inch bit followed by a 20’’ underreamer. 
The supplemental adapter pre-installed in the 22’’ casing for the 16’’ casing was then 
used. This adapter was only 160 feet below the wellhead, thus meaning the 16’’ casing 
was planned to run almost the full length of the well. However, the cement job only 
covered about 40% of the way up to the open wellbore. 
 
It would have taken only 6 or 7 days to drill the 2,500 feet of this section as per well 
plan, but it actually took about 20 days and was drilled 2,616 feet. It is reported that 
the well experienced some lost-circulation and/or kick problems for about a week 
which probably affected the progress of the project. 
 
As the well was getting to a considerable depth, three burst/rupture disks were 
installed in the 16’’ string to protect the well from excessive pressure increasing. These 
devices are designed to release gas or fluid pressure inside or outside the string if they 
exceed set levels.  
 
Among the main risks of a deepwater well, pressure build-up is one of the most 
important to be taken into account. The wellbore temperature during the drilling 
phase is approximately the same as the mud’s temperature, which will be an average 
of the temperature the mud finds during its course through the long riser (much 
cooler) and the well (approximately 262ºF at the bottom). 
 
On the other hand, the wellbore temperature during the production phase will likely 
be much higher as it tends to be similar to the hot fluid temperature that comes from 
the bottom of the well. Because of this increase in temperature, fluid or gas trapped in 
the casing annuli during the drilling phase will probably expand and put pressure on 
the casing which could potentially cause a rupture or collapse. 
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13 – 5/8’’ LINER 
 
This section was planned to be drilled within 6 to 10 days and 3,000 feet deep but 
instead it took 19 days and drilled only 1,560 feet. It has been reported that on March 
8th 2010, when the Macondo Well had progressed to 13,305 total depth, the well 
experienced a serious well control event because unexpectedly well formation fluids 
“flowed” into the wellbore. The influx went unnoticed for approximately half an hour 
and resulted in the drillstring and well logging tools becoming stuck in the hole, which 
led to the realization of a sidetrack to allow drilling to continue.  
 
Well control events are preventative measures to prevent fluids from entering the 
wellbore (kicks), and in the case that they have entered, control their flow to avoid 
blowouts. Therefore, well control is usually referred to as blowout prevention. The 
actions taken to prevent a blowout consist of using the mud or fluid column to counter 
balance the formation pressures in the wellbore and, in case this defence doesn’t work 
as expected, using the BOP as the last option to solve the issue.  
 
Although a sidetrack is not that uncommon when drilling, it is a nuisance in order to 
accomplish the planned schedule in the well plan. When an obstruction in the well 
cannot be drilled through and it has to be drilled around. In the case of the Macondo 
Well, the drillpipe and well logging tools became stuck in the hole and could not be 
freed. Schlumberger determined where the pipe was stuck so that a determination 
could be made where the pipe should be cut and sidetracked.  
 
As this section was planned to be a liner, thus meaning it was not running from the 
wellhead and no supplemental adapters were pre-installed on previous casings, a 
“hanger” and a “packer” were required to be used in this well for the first time. This 
13-5/8’’ liner was to be hung off the bottom of the prior 16’’ casing. A “hanger” is has 
metal gripping devices that can be activated to wedge between the outside of the 
hanger in the string to be hang off and the inside of the prior casing string, making the 
casing suspend. The space left between the two casing strings is sealed by an 
elastomeric ring that can be expanded called “packer”.  
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Hanger and Packer 
The Macondo Well 
Part 3 in a Series about the Macondo Well (Deepwater Horizon) Blowout 
By Paul Parsons – July 15, 2010 
 
A revised casing design was prepared by BP and approved by the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) to address the high formation pressure in the borehole as 
a result of the well control event. The revised casing design included the addition of a 
9-7/8’’ drilling liner and the change of the production string from a 9-7/8’’ in long 
string to a combination 9-7/8 in. x 7 in. long string.  
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11-7/8’’ LINER 
 
The 11-7/8’’ liner was perhaps the most trouble-free section to be drilled. It took 2 
days less than the planned 8 days and was drilled only 42 feet shallower than the 2,000 
feet planned on the well design.  
 
9-7/8’’ LINER 
 
This section took 5 days, half of the expected time, and was drilled 2,065 feet instead 
of the planned 2,500 feet. Nevertheless, this section had to reach the target at 14,569 
feet below the mudline but it ended at 12,101 feet, thus requiring another bottom 
hole section which would also be narrower than the originally planned 9-7/8’’ width. 
By the end of the March 2010, the well had already reached this stage at about a 
17,000 feet total depth. 
 
7’’ x 9-7/8’’ CASING 
 
According to the well plan, the well had still to be drilled 1,218 feet in order to reach 
the primary target and 2,468 feet to reach and pass through the secondary target. The 
well never reached this depth if this was still the intention of BP at this stage of the 
project. The drilling operations for this section started on April 2nd 2010 and the bit 
used to drill this final hole section was 8-1/2’’ wide followed by a 9-7/8’’ reamer placed 
230 feet back on the drill string. 
 
Before reaching to the primary target, some other thinner, intermittent sand layers 
were found. During early drilling of this hole section, the mud weight used to contain 
pressure in some layers began causing mud losses in other layers as the characteristics 
of surrounding formations were highly unstable. When this section had been drilled 
650 feet, the first hydrocarbons were encountered in a thin sand section. At this point, 
mud weight was lowered to reduce mud losses. However, more mud losses were 
found on the way to the primary target. 
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The first objective of the Macondo Prospect was reached approximately at the 
expected depth. It was a 123’-thick layer which contained oil and gas in the upper 
53feet and water in the remaining 70 feet. The well logging contractor, Schlumberger, 
spent six days performing and evaluating wireline logs using electronic sensors that 
measured properties such as resistivity, conductivity and formation pressure as well as 
sonic properties and wellbore dimensions.  
 
Moreover, the mud is a good way to notice when hydrocarbons are coming from the 
well. A contractor called “mud logger” periodically samples the mud characteristics as 
it passes through the mud processing equipment, which also has gas monitors that 
work continuously detecting the presence of gas. Immediately after drilling through 
the primary target, about 3,000 barrels of mud, which can cost about $200 to $500 
each barrel, were lost before the outflow was stopped with lost circulation material 
(LCM) and mud weight reduction. 
 
Finally, on April 9th 2010, the well was drilled to a final depth of 18,360 feet measured 
from the rig, or 13,293 feet measured from the mudline. BP reported that having a 
14.15 ppg exposed sand and taking losses in a 12.6 ppg reservoir in the same hole-
section had forced their decision to finish the well at this depth. They were in a highly 
unstable formation all the way to the end. 
 
To place a cement shoe in a lost-circulation zone is not a safe place to be set because a 
cement job normally requires a rigorous pre-cementing mud circulation to clean out 
the hole followed by a cement flow that exerts high pressure. The cement flow must 
take a pounding u-turn and travel back up the annulus between the outside of the 
casing and the wellbore walls and, if the shoe area is weak, fluids can be lost into the 
weak formation instead of flowing up. 
 
The weak cement shoe placed at the bottom of the well may very well have been the 
first key event toward the blowout. The cement job is suspected of having a faulty 
result that allowed hydrocarbons to escape up the wellbore. By drilling deeper or by 
taking other actions, BP could have brought the well to a better shoe position.  
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WIRELINE LOGS AND RESERVOIR CHARACTERISTICS 
 
After drilling stopped, on April 10th 2010, four more days were spent performing and 
evaluating wireline logs, which are taken by tools that lowered into the wellbore on a 
steel cable with electrical wiring inside to power the tools and send/receive data. 
Wireline logs usually provides the rig crew with information about the wellbore path, 
formation boundaries, rock type, porosity, estimated permeability, location of oil and 
gas, formation angles and downhole pressure and temperature. 
 
The wireline log also measures the wellbore diameter throughout the uncased section 
by using a “caliper” log. The information provided by the caliper log is important for 
designing and completing a proper cement job, as it makes possible to know how 
much cement is required to reach the desired level. 
 
LONG STRING PRODUCTION CASING 
 
For the final casing, BP used a long production casing string which is hung from the 
wellhead with a casing hanger and ran the full length of the well. The long string used 
in the Macondo well was 7’’ on the bottom, crossing over to 9-7/8’’ further up the well 
to allow more room for any equipment needed later down the wellbore during the 
completion and production phases.  
 
This kind of final casing that ran the full length of the well required a good cement job 
in order to prevent any leakage of hydrocarbons in the production zone from flowing 
up to the casing hanger seal at the wellhead, which is not usually designed to be a 
primary line of defence against high pressure. 
 
A reportedly safer design and more-commonly used in this kind of sections is a two-
stage process of installing a liner in the final hole section and then installing a separate 
“tie-back” casing string between the liner and the wellhead. This design provides two 
 65 
extra barriers added to the cement and the casing hanger seal: the liner packer at the 
top of the liner string and the cement used to settle the tieback string into place. 
 
 
Long String vs. Liner with Tieback 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
 
The decision to use a long string production casing design instead of a liner and tie-
back option meant that BP would save 3 days of work and about $7 to $10 million. It 
has been also reported that, by choosing the long string production casing, the well 
design would be simpler and the long-term integrity of the string would be better 
without the potential deterioration of the tie-back connection.  
 
The casing shoe was planned to be placed 56 feet above the bottom of the hole which 
would imply leaving an uncased empty area called a “rathole” at the bottom to allow 
debris to fall harmlessly out of the way during the completion phase and to provide a 
pressure cushion between the hole bottom and the shoe. 
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CEMENT MODELING 
 
On April 12th 2010, BP asked the cementing contractor, Halliburton, to perform an 
analysis of a long string tapered production casing design that would utilize the 
performance of lighter-weight nitrogen foamed cement. Nitrified cement is commonly 
used to minimize circulation problems because of its lower density and therefore 
lighter and has less resistance to friction forces while circulating, thus also reducing the 
bottom hole pressures and avoiding losses into the weak formation. 
 
Halliburton conducted tests on the proposed foamed cement mix which showed no 
compressive strength at 24 hours after placement. They also showed that it would take 
48 hours at a temperature of 180 ºF to achieve a compressive strength of 1,590 psi. On 
the 15th of April 2010, Halliburton updated its cementing model with the well log data 
and assumed that a lighter-weight “nitrogen foamed” cement would be used to reduce 
the bottom hole pressure and would be pumped slowly so not to break the LCM 
barrier. 
 
NITROGEN-FOAMED CEMENT 
 
Nitrogen-foamed cement is lightened up with micro-bubbles by adding surfactant and 
injecting nitrogen gas into the cement as it is pumped down the wellbore. Foamed 
cement works better than regular cement in some applications, although it is relatively 
more expensive too. Bubbles stiffen the wet cement so that it is less prone to being 
lost into a zone or being invaded by fluids in a zone. It had already been used on the 
Macondo well for the top two cemented sections, the 28’’ conductor and 22’’ surface 
casing as it is good at sealing off shallow aquifers. However, use of nitrogen foam is 
less common for deep, high-temperature, high-pressure zones.   
 
The lighter foamed weight and a slowly pumping of the cement was expected to 
minimize the pressure increase that would likely occur due to the cement flow. The 
Minerals Management Service required that at least 500 feet above the highest 
hydrocarbon-bearing zone were covered by cement. Despite the primary target was 
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only 277 feet above the hole bottom, a thin hydrocarbon zone had been found out 539 
feet from the bottom, thus meaning that at least the cement would have to extend 
1,039 feet up the annulus.  
 
The extent of the cement affected the length of pumping required, the pumping 
pressure required and also the bottom-hole pressure immediately after pumping 
because a 1,039 feet column of 14.2 ppg cement would be where 14 ppg mud had 
previously been. One of the solutions to this issue was to pump so light 6.7 ppg “base 
oil” ahead of the top of the cement to displace more 14 ppg mud out of the top of the 
well and creating some weight compensation.  
 
The lighter cement and low pumping pressure required to protect the LCM barrier was 
found to be causing a flow up the annulus that was too weak to push all of the mud 
out of the way to get a solid displacement with cement, overall if the casing was not 
well-centred in the hole. The Halliburton modeller had assumed that 10 centralizers 
would be used to centre the casing, spread along the bottom 500 feet of the string. 
 
If the pipe is not well-centred, the cement flow can channel through the side of the 
pipe with more room and not displacing the mud on the tight side, thus making it to be 
a low quality cement job. The distance between the formation wall and the outside of 
the casing divided by the distance that would be present if the pipe were perfectly 
centred is referred to as the “standoff percentage”. This percentage must always be 
over 70% to ensure an even cement distribution around the casing.   
 
CENTRALIZERS 
 
Centralizers are mechanical devices used to maintain the casing or liner centred into 
the wellbore in order to ensure that the cement is equally distributed around the 
casing. On the contrary, the cement would not be properly placed and it would result 
in an imperfect seal and, in the worst case, it would allow hydrocarbons to flow into 
and up the annulus. 
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Despite some opinions supporting the option of a liner and tieback, BP finally reported 
that the long string was the chosen option for the last production section. Halliburton 
generated a model showing that the long string was an acceptable option after all only 
if 21 centralizers were used instead of 10. 
 
However, it was planned to use 6 centralizers that they had on hand, which were even 
less than the 10 centralizers assumed in the first model that had bad results. The 
drilling engineering team made the necessary arrangements to deliver the 15 extra 
centralizers to the rig on April 16th 2010. However, the well team refused to use them 
because they erroneously believed that they were of the wrong type. 
 
CEMENT BOND LOG 
 
The internal report of BP that finally recommended the long string warned of problems 
that could result if “losses” occurred, which meant that some of the cement pumped 
could flow into the surrounding formation walls instead of flowing up the annulus. 
Moreover, a poor cement job could also result in hydrocarbons flowing to the 
wellhead where the only remaining barrier was the casing hanger seal assembly. In 
addition, the top of the cement may not reach the requested level as per MMS 
regulations, thus increasing the potential risk of hydrocarbons flowing uncontrolled.  
 
In the case that losses are found, an Ultrasonic Imager Tool (USIT) log might be needed 
in order to generate a report called a cement bond log (CBL). A CBL gives a 360º view 
around the wellbore of the thickness of the cement and the quality of the cement 
bond to the casing. If cement gaps or channels are found, there are some remediation 
procedures available including a process referred to as “squeeze” cementing. In this 
process, the casing in the problem area is perforated and cement is forced in the 
outside space with a special tool. Finally, the perforated section of casing is lined over. 
 
A CBL have a cost of about $128,000 and take 9 to 12 hours, thus meaning an even-
higher rig cost. BP’s intention was to perform the CBL in case losses were discovered 
although Halliburton’s modelling report had suggested that the mere absence of losses 
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would not be an indicator of success. A Schlumberger crew arrived at the Deepwater 
Horizon on April 18th 2010 to perform a cement bond log if required.  
 
RUNNING CASING 
 
On April 16th and 17th, the drilling mud on the bottom of the well was circulated out of 
the hole to clean out all hydrocarbons and settled cuttings, which is referred to as 
“bottoms up”. After that, an operation called a “wiper trip” was performed, which 
means to lower an 8-1/2 inch bit to the bottom hole section to ensure that the 
wellbore was still clear before installing the casing. Formation walls could have 
crumbled into the hole as the hole had been idle for about 6 days.  
 
Before performing the cementing job, a common industry practice is to pump at least 
the greater of the following: the mud volume in the casing to make sure nothing is in 
the casing that could block the float collar or the volume of mud in the annulus to 
make sure any gaseous mud is flushed completely out of the well, which is called a 
“bottoms up” circulation. 
 
It was reported that in the Macondo Well only 342 barrels were circulated before 
cementing on the final production casing, which is about half of the casing volume. BP 
stated that pre-cementing circulation plus the mud displacement that occurred during 
the cement job accomplished a bottoms up to a point above the wellhead, but not all 
the way to the rig, which meant that any hydrocarbons flushed out of the hole were 
left lingering at the riser bottom. This fact increased even more the risk of a potential 
failure of the project.  
 
Finally it wasn’t until the 18th of April 2010 when the casing process started. The first 
stage in this process was to install a 7’’ shoe track assembly with the shoe and float 
collar 190 feet apart. Once this first task was done, the 7’’ casing was placed above and 
then a “crossover” to flare out to 9-7/8’’. Finally, the final 9-7/8’’ casing was set into 
place with its casing hanger and an unset seal assembly on top. As with the 18’’ and 
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16’’ casing hangers, the 9-7/8’’ casing hanger had ports to allow displaced mud to 
escape during pre-cementing circulation and during cement pumping.  
 
A cement plug tool was installed followed by a tool that would be used to set the seal 
assembly around the casing hanger once the cement job had finished. The assembly 
was lowered down on the drillpipe until the casing hanger landed in the wellhead. The 
mud was pumped to create the pressure needed to unlock or “convert” the float collar 
flapper valves by pushing through the conversion ball. The conversion procedure 
should have taken one attempt at 500 to 700 psi but instead took 9 attempts and a 
final pressure of 3,142 psi. The pressure to rupture the burst disk of the bottom wiper 
plug was also higher than usual, around  2,900 psi, when it usually requires only 900 to 
1,100 psi. 
 
PUMPING CEMENT ON THE FINAL PRODUCTION CASING STRING 
 
Once the drilling mud circulation was over, the cement job began. The first action was 
to pump the 7 barrels of 6.7 ppg base oil to sit above the cement in the annulus to 
lighten the hydrostatic pressure. In order to prevent the base oil from contaminating 
the cement, about 72 barrels of 14.3 ppg spacer fluid were pumped in between and, 
behind this fluid, the bottom-plug dart was released. 
 
After the bottom-plug dart, a total quantity of 60 barrels of cement was mixed and 
pumped, which consisted of 5 barrels of regular 16.7 ppg cement first, then 39 barrels 
foamed up to a volume of 48 barrels of 14.2 ppg foamed cement and 7 final barrels of 
16.7 regular cement. As the plug had to pass through the 7’’ casing yet also do an 
effective wiping job in the 9-7/8’’ casing above, it was required to be a special one. 
However, the risk of cement being contaminated is not completely eradiated.  
 
Mud was pumped again to push the slurry through the several different parts of this 
section until the bottom plug landed on the float collar. Then, the pump stroke counter 
would have been set to zero to count the amount of cement flow between plugs and 
the pressure would have been increased to 900 to 1,100 psi to burst the barrier in the 
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bottom plug, thus commencing the cement placement. The slurry flowed down the 
190-foot shoe track, out the shoe ports, u-turn against the trapped mud in the 56 foot 
rathole and reached about 1,000 feet up the annulus until the top plug bumped on the 
float collar and halted all flow, when pressure had to be released to allow a small 
backflow to close the flapper valves of the float collar.  
 
There are a couple of measures that can be performed to make sure the cement job 
has been done correctly. The first is to compare the amount of mud that has been 
displaced out of the well and the volume of cement recorded by the pump stroke 
counter, which should be the same. The other is to check the backflow pressure that 
cement exerts if it has made its way up the annulus. If less pressure than expected, this 
would mean that cement has entered into the surrounding formations rather than 
flowing up in the annulus space. However, as a lighter-foamed cement and base oil on 
top were used in this section, a lower backflow pressure was expected. 
 
 
Cement Job on the Production Casing 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
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After finishing the cement job at 00:36 on April 20th 2010, the casing hanger seal was 
set between the side of the casing hanger seal and the wellhead walls to seal off the 
annulus. However, to avoid extreme pressures from causing some movement in the 
seal, a “lockdown sleeve” must be installed above the casing hanger. However, the 
installation of this device was postponed until after the well had been displaced with 
seawater, thus permitting pressure to lift up the casing hanger out of its seat and 
create a path for hydrocarbons to get to the rig. 
 
The cement passes through several phases from liquid/foam to gelled-liquid to weak-
solid to firmsolid during its setting process. It is essential not to disturb cement when 
setting, especially during its weak-solid phase because, if disturbed during this phase, 
the cement will not rebound to its original position. A laboratory test of the foamed 
cement indicated that it had not solidified at 24 hours (0 psi compressive strength) and 
needed 48 to strongly solidify (1,590 psi), which was much more time than the 15 
hours required for regular cement to reach 2,100 psi compressive strength. Despite 
this information was widely acknowledged, ten and a half hoursafter pumping finished 
a “positive test” was conducted. 
 
POSITIVE TEST 
 
A positive test serves to determine if there are any leaks or points weak enough to 
rupture by applying pressure to the casing string. In this particular case, the casing was 
pressured up to 2,500 psi for 30 minutes at 10:55 on April 20th 2010. This test is 
performed by shutting the blind shear rams and pumping mud down the kill line.  
 
Cement wouldn’t probably be disturbed directly by the positive test because the only 
way for it to escape would be the casing hanger seal at the top, which had already 
been tested to 8,500 psi, or through the float collar at the bottom, which was blocked 
by the top plug. However, despite being rigid, a casing can expand minimally and break 
cement bonds closest to the casing, creating what is called a “micro-annulus” around 
the casing. This could mean a clear path for hydrocarbons to get to the casing hanger 
seals in the wellhead. As no losses were noticed, the Schlumberger crew left the 
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Deepwater Horizon at 11:15 on a regularly-scheduled helicopter flight because no 
cement bond long would be requested. The positive test had determined that no fluid 
was capable of flowing out of the casing.  
 
The procedure for temporary abandonment of the Macondo well, which allowed the 
drilling rig to safely remove its BOP and riser from the well and leave the well site so 
that another rig could later complete the construction process (perforate the casing 
and install equipment to collect hydrocarbons), also implied displacing 3,300 feet of 
drilling mud with seawater. The sequence for preparation of temporary abandonment 
of the Macondo well implied running a “negative test”, displacing the mud in the riser 
with seawater so that the riser could be disassembled and the mud could be hauled off 
for use on another well, setting a cement plug required for securing the well during its 
temporary abandonment, doing a “lead impression test” to determine whether the 
casing hanger was seated properly and finally install a lockdown sleeve to lock down 
the casing hanger and seal. 
 
US regulations require that the plug be set no more than 1,000 feet below the ocean 
floor, but in this particular case it was approved to be set at 3,300 feet. This prevented 
the wellhead area from being contaminated, which is a good decision considering that 
the lockdown sleeve was to be installed after setting the plug. As all mud above the 
plug was to be removed, by setting the plug deeper, a greater quantity of expensive 
mud could also be recovered and used in another well. A supply boat called Damon 
Bankston was moored to the Deepwater Horizon on April 20th 2010 to collect all mud. 
 
NEGATIVE TEST 
 
The first step to be done was to carry out the negative test because it could not be 
performed if the plug was set before.Lowering on the drillstring the 821-foot string of 
3-1/2’’ tubing called as “stinger”, which is also used for cementing, to the point where 
the plug had to be set was the first to be done. In order to prepare for the negative 
test, the choke and kill lines were flushed with seawater. 
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The objective of a negative test is to reduce hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore below 
reservoir pressure to explore for any leakage path through the cement into the 
wellbore that had not already been discovered by the positive test. The main paths for 
hydrocarbons are through the casing shoe, through the casing hanger seal up in the 
wellhead, through any leaking casing seams, and through any casing collapse that 
might occur after the wellbore pressure was reduced. 
 
Wellbore pressure was reduced by replacing the 14.7 ppg mud in the boost line, choke 
line, kill line drill pipe and above the plug-setting point with 8.6 ppg seawater, which 
weighs much less. The mud below the plug would be left in place until the production 
phase. 424 barrels of 16 ppg high-viscosity mud were pumped through the stinger to 
separate the synthetic oil based mud and the 352 barrels of seawater that followed. 
The mud below the plug-setting point exerted a higher resistance than the mud above 
this point, because while the latter could escape up through the riser, the first one had 
no way to go due to the shoe track at the bottom of the casing. Therefore, when the 
spacer exited the stinger, it made a U-turn and went up to the wellhead sweeping the 
regular mud out of the well.  
 
Once the section of the well between the plug-setting point and a point above the BOP 
was determined to be full of seawater, pumping stopped and the annular preventer 
was closed. Then, pressure was bled off the drillstring and the kill line. Only enough 
fluid would backflow to account for the pressure release and pressure in both the 
drillstring and the kill line would drop to zero if all resulted as expected. After that, the 
well would remain static with no backflow. If there was a leak which could cause an 
inflow, it would be now noticed as the well was underbalanced for the first time: the 
pressure at the bottom of the wellbore was less than the formation pressure. 
 
However, the test didn’t go as planned. More fluid backflow than expected was 
noticed and the drillpipe pressure dropped to a minimum of 273 psi, never reaching to 
zero. Rig personnel also noticed that the mud level in the riser had dropped about 50 
barrels because the annular prevent had failed and mud had contaminated the 
seawater test area, thus interfering with the results. Nevertheless, they did not notice 
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that not enough seawater had been pumped to move all mud spacer above the BOP, 
which could have blocked flow through the narrow kill line and have also influenced 
the results. To stop the suspected leak, the hydraulic pressure on the annular 
preventer was increased from 1,200 psi to 1,900 psi and the riser was refilled.  
 
 
Spacer blocking flow in the narrow kill line 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
 
While the results were being discussed with the drillpipe and kill lines closed, the 
pressure unexpectedly increased from 1,200 psi to 1,250 psi in 6 minutes. After 
discussing for about an hour, it was agreed that another negative test would be 
conducted. At about 17:27 the second test began by trying to reduce the drillpipe 
pressure to zero again. Instead of 3.5 barrels of backflow expected to relieve the 
pressure, 15 barrels were observed. Then, a valve at the top of the drillstring was 
closed to monitor pressure, which quickly rose to 790 psi and then fell, slowly 
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rebuilding to 1,400 psi. No seawater seemed to be pumped to displace the 50 barrels 
that had previously leaked in the test area. 
 
Then, the kill line was opened and fluid flowed out and the line was shut again, 
although according to a witness, fluid was still flowing. The pressure on the drillstring 
returned to 1,400 psi from 18:00 to 18:35. Seawater was pumped down the kill line to 
make sure it was full and unobstructed and it was opened again to observe backflow. 
After a small volume of backflow, the flow through the kill line stopped. At 19:55, this 
was accepted as a result good enough to consider the negative test had been 
successful, despite the pressure on the drillpipe never dropped to zero. Post-blowout 
analysis suggests that spacer mud flowed into the kill line and blocked the backflow. It 
is very likely that the toolpusher expected anomalous pressure results on the drillipipe 
due to the mud that had entered the test area. 
 
RISER DISPLACEMENT 
 
At 20:02 on April 20th 2010, the riser displacement with seawater started. The first 
operation was to open the annular preventer so that seawater pumping could be 
pumped again down the drillpipe to displace all mud out of the riser. When the 
annular preventer was opened, the well was placed in an overbalanced state. As mud 
was being displaced with seawater, the wellbore pressure decreased placing the well 
in an underbalanced condition again at about 20:52. 
 
The only way to observe influx during pumping is to monitor changes in mud levels in 
the mud pits on the rig. An increase of mud pit level would be a clear indication that 
fluid had entered the wellbore and were coming up to the rig. However, during riser 
displacement, only seawater is being pumped into the wellbore and mud pits are only 
receiving mud. Moreover, mud pit workers are busy during this kind of operations 
directing flow between pits to fill each one. The only way left to monitor a possible 
influx is on the driller’s data-panel, although it is not precise and it was destroyed by 
the blow-out. It shows the volume of seawater being pumped and the volume of mud 
being received on the rig, which volumes should approximately equal each other.  
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Fortunately, Halliburton’s equipment was plugged into this data stream, recorded the 
data and was not destroyed by the blowout, thus providing the investigators with a 
graph of rig data for the last two hours before the blowout. The pumping continued for 
about an hour and it was later slowed to watch for the water-based spacer mud to 
begin returning. When it was identified, pumping was stopped so an M-I-SWACO mud 
compliance specialist to do a “sheen test”, which is used to determine that the spacer 
had not been contaminated by the synthetic oil based mud ahead of it. 
 
 
View of the driller's data-panel 
Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout 
Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG) - March 2011 
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSGFinalReport-March2011-tag.pdf 
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THE BLOWOUT 
 
About 21:05, three minutes before pumping was stopped, an increase in mud inflows 
was reflected in the driller’s panel relative to the amount of seawater being pumped. 
However, a receiving tank called “trip tank” was being emptied of its synthetic oil 
based mud in preparation for arrival of the water-based spacer. The trip tank emptied 
into the “shakers”, which is the first mud-processing station, where mud returns when 
it flows out of the top of the riser and the point where the driller’s panel collects data 
about mud outflow. Therefore, the readings could have been considered as distorted 
but about a minute later the trip tank emptying stopped, thus making possible during 2 
minutes to detect that the inflow was higher than the seawater pump rates. 
 
Immediately after seawater pumping finished, there were 2 more minutes when mud 
was flowing into the pits, but it was not detected. The pressure on the drill pipe 
continued increasing 246 psi although the pumps were stopped, but this seemed to 
have also been unnoticed. Within a minute of stopping for the sheen test, the well 
outflow was directed overboard in anticipation of a successful test, bypassing the 
mudlogger’s flow meter and the mud pits, making it impossible for the mudlogger to 
monitor any backflow. Despite that there was no pumping at that moment, the well 
was flowing overboard on its own.  
 
Once the sheen test was successful (the spacer had not been contaminated by the oil-
based mud ahead of it), seawater pumping resumed at 21:14 to continue discharging 
the spacer overboard and to continue flushing the riser with seawater. However, all 
flow was then going overboard and there was no method to record outflow volume 
except for a flapper-valve meter on the riser’s top, which is a very inaccurate system. 
At 21:31, mud pumps were shut down, probably because it had been noticed a 
pressure increase in the drillpipe and a higher level of outflow than expected since 
pumping resumed at 21:14. Over the next few minutes until 21:34, pressure in the drill 
pressure began increasing from 1,210 psi to 1,766 psi. From 21:36 to 21:38, another 
sudden pressure change was experienced. The drillpipe pressure decreased from 1,782 
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psi to 714 psi and then, increased from 714 psi to 1,353 psi. Post-blowout analyses 
have determined that hydrocarbons did not enter the well until 21:38. 
 
At approximately 21:40, seawater was pushed to the top of the drill derrick followed 
by drilling mud which flowed uncontrolled onto the rig floor. The BP investigation 
indicates that hydrocarbons coming through the riser were diverted to the mud gas 
separator (MGS) just one minute later, at 21:41. However, this device was not 
designed for such a volume of gas and well fluids as this well was producing and it was 
quickly overwhelmed. It is not known why the mud gas separator was chosen instead 
of diversion overboard, but probably concerns about discharging oil-based drilling mud 
into the sea made them think the best choice was to use the MGS. An attempt was 
made to shut in the well at the same time by activating the annular preventer. At 
21:47 another attempt to shut in the well was made by trying to activate the Variable 
Bore Rams (VBRs), which quickly caused the pressure to rise from 1,200 to 5,730 psi.  
 
 
Mud Gas Separator 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
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The liquefied gas that was already in the riser above the BOP expanded rapidly, 
pushing seawater and drill mud ahead of it. Not much gas was required to result in a 
violent outburst and gas flooding on to the rig because the wind was calm. The engines 
began to get gas in their intakes, causing them to increase their speed, which caused 
the generators to over-generate. At 21:49, rig power and recorded data were lost. 
Attempts to activate the emergency shutdown systems failed before and after the 
explosion failed.  
 
Reports state that it is very likely that due to failures in the blue and yellow pods on 
the BOP, the automatic mode function (AMF, which activates the blind shear rams) 
could not have been completed. All attempts to activate the blowout preventer shear 
rams failed. The Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) to separate the Deepwater 
Horizon from the Blowout Preventer did not result and the Lower Marine Riser 
Package did not unlatch. 
 
It has been estimated that the first explosion took place within seconds after the 
power loss, followed by a second explosion after only 10 seconds. At 21:52, when the 
crew on the bridge realized the seriousness of the situation, a mayday call was made 
by the Deepwater Horizon. At 21:56 the on-watch Dynamic Positioning Officer (DPO) 
activated the Deepwater Horizon’s Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) 
Digital Select Calling (DSC) Alert. Various alarms and critical safety systems failed to 
operate as expected. Some witnesses reported that fire and gas detectors were not 
operating or had been inhibited to avoid waking crewmembers in the middle of the 
night due to false alarms. Sensors were able to detect the fire or gas and send this 
information the computer, but the alarm required manual activation. On the bridge 
there was a general chaos as the crew was trying to assess the situation, shutting down 
the well and disconnecting from the wellhead. 
 
However, many of the members did not hear any alarms and began evacuating the rig 
as soon as they realized the impact of the blowout by mustering at the lifeboat 
stations. Even some members were hanging on the side rails ready to jump to sea. 
Finally, the order to muster and evacuate was given, although four members did not 
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wait for orders and jumped to the sea between 21:59 and 22:09. At last, two lifeboats 
measuring 8.50 x 2.89 x 1.25 m, each with a capacity for 73-occupants, placed at the 
forward end of the rig were successfully launched: lifeboat Nº 2 was launched at 22:19 
and the lifeboat Nº 1 at 22:25. They both made their way to the Damon Bankston, 
which had previously been warned to back away when some control problems had 
been experienced on the rig prior to the explosion. 
 
The Damon Bankston, in response to the call for help made from the Deepwater 
Horizon, launched a Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) at 22:12 to rescue those at sea. Seven 
members have been reported not to be able to board any of the lifeboats and had to 
use a 25-foot life raft to evacuate. The life raft reached the water at about 22:35, but 
the crew realized the raft had attached a line from the rig which prevented them from 
leaving the scene. Four more crew members still on the rig had no choice but to jump 
to the sea at about 22:37, after the life raft and the lifeboat had been launched. 
Finally, the fast rescue craft launched by the Damon Bankston rescued those from the 
water, make its way to the tethered raft, cut the line and tow it to a safer place. 
 
A group of Transocean and BP executives had arrived at the rig around 14:30 on the 
same day of the blowout and witnessed the events. The executives included BP’s vice 
president of drilling and drilling operations manager and two Transocean senior 
managers. One of the scheduled tasks was to present an award for the Deepwater 
Horizon’s safety record, which had been very good until the disaster. The blast severely 
damaged the rig floor area and surrounding quarters.  
 
Once all the survivors were onboard the Damon Bankston, a muster was organized. At 
23:30 it was established that 11 of the 126 workers on board the rig, including nine 
Transocean employees and two M-I-SWACO mud service contractors, were missing. 
The other 115 crew members of the Deepwater Horizon at the moment of the 
explosion were evacuated. Seventeen of these members were seriously injured and 
were evacuated from the Damon Bankston to the shore by helicopter. 
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SEARCH AND RESCUE AND FIRE-FIGHTING OPERATIONS 
 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) launched an immediately massive rescue 
operation to search for the 11 missing workers. The Captain of the Marine Safety Unit, 
Joseph Paradis, directed those preliminary efforts to search for the missing people. 
Therefore, he became the first Federal On-Scene Coordinator under what is known the 
National Contingency Plan, a set of federal regulations prescribing the government’s 
response to spills of oil and other hazardous materials. Under the Plan, when a spill 
occurs in coastal waters, the Coast Guard has the authority to respond.  
 
The Coast Guard helicopter CG-6605 was launched at 22:28 and was the first to arrive 
on scene at 23:10. The aircraft HC-144A (CG-2308) departed at 22:40 and arrived five 
minutes after the helicopter. At a quarter to eleven p.m., the USCGC Pompano (CG-
87339) departed Coast Guard Station (STA) Venice, LA., and four minutes later, the 
USCGC Cobia (CG-87311) was also diverted to assist in the rescue operations. As Coast 
Guard vessels continued the search and rescue operations, private offshore supply 
vessels, such as Monica Ann or Lee, sprayed water on the fire. During that night, many 
other helicopters such as the CG-6576, CG-6010 and the CG-6508 were launched to 
assist with the Search and Rescue operations.  
 
Almost three hours later after the explosion, four ships were applying water to the fire: 
Seacor Lee, Gulf Princess, Norbert Bouzigard and Monica Ann. Bee Sting and Katrina 
Fagan also reached thereafter the Deepwater Horizon’s position and began spraying 
the rig with water. Many other supply ships were directed to search for the missing 
people in a specific area. At approximately 01:30, the rig began developing a list 
towards its starboard stern along with secondary explosions. About 03:30 that night, 
Transocean hired a salvage company, Smit Salvage Americas to assist developing a 
salvage plan. More vessels such as the MR. Sidney and the Fast Cajun continued 
arriving later to help with fire-fighting attempts and search and rescue operations.  
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Vessels fighting the fire in the Deepwater Horizon 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/14/local/la-me-gs-gulf-reopens-to-drilling-victoria-principal-
pounces-20111214 
 
Finally, at 07:30 the USCGC Zephyr arrived on-scene and assumed On-Scene 
Coordinator (OSC) responsibility of SAR operations that USCGC Pompano had assumed 
so far. Then, the Damon Bankston was ordered to head to the shore to disembark the 
ninety-eight Deepwater Horizon’s persons remaining on-board. During the morning, 
vessels such as C-Enforcer and Joe Griffin, which relieved Lee of her duties, joined the 
fire-fighting operations.  
 
By the afternoon of the 21st of April, vessels such as the Max Chouest and C-Express 
launched their ROVs to try to activate the Deepwater Horizon’s BOP rams and shut the 
well. On the same day, Rear Admiral Mary Landry, commander of Coast Guard District 
8 (which includes among other regions, the Gulf coast from Texas to the Florida 
panhandle) took over as Federal On-Scene Coordinator and remained until the 1st of 
June, when she was relieved of her duty by Rear Admiral James Watson. 
 
The next morning, the rig began listing even more to starboard and to stern. As the rig 
was capsizing, the ships around it trying to extinguish the fire moved away to a safer 
place. The Deepwater Horizon semi-submersible rig sank in position 28º 43,8’N and 
88º 21,6’ W at 10.26 on 22nd April 2010. During the efforts to extinguish the fire, there 
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was confusion about whether Transocean, the US Coast Guard, the salvage company 
hired by Transocean that day (Smit Salvage Americas) or anyone at all was directing 
the operations. Based on logs obtained from response vessels, 11 different vessels 
reported engaging in fire-fighting efforts during the response.  
 
It has been widely reported that some of the seawater used to try to cool the structure 
and control the fire could have accumulated inside the hull due to many causes such as 
internal damage to watertight subdivisions, poor maintenance of watertight closures 
or simply having left watertight closures open prior to the evacuation, this 
compromising rig’s stability. The final position of the rig on the ocean floor with the 
upper hull buried has made it impossible to check much of the damage caused by the 
blowout and the consequent fire.  
 
 
Final position of the Deepwater Horizon rig on the ocean floor 
Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of 
Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=6700 
 
At 18:53 on April 23rd, the USCG finally called off the search for the missing workers. 
After surveying more than 5,000 square miles, it was concluded that the missing 
workers had been near the blast and unable to escape the sudden explosion. The riser 
connecting the rig with the wellhead was cut and about 4,000 feet of it fall back to the 
sea floor, looping around as it fell, so that the broken end was approximately 2,000 
feet from the wellhead.  
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ATTEMPTS TO SEAL THE WELL OFF 
 
BP’s earliest attempt to stop the flow of oil and gas was to close the BOP by activating 
the blind shear rams. By mid-afternoon on April 23rd, the subsea vehicles discovered a 
leak at the end of the riser, where it had broken off from the Deepwater Horizon, 
when the rig sank. On the next morning, oil was found leaking from a kink in the riser 
above the BOP. On the same April 24th, The USCG reported the well was leaking about 
1,000 barrels per day. As it was being realized that the early efforts to stop the flow by 
triggering the BOP failed, other ways to control the well were beginning to be 
considered. 
 
The following day, BP began the process to drill two relief wells, a primary and a back-
up in case the primary wasn’t able to reach its target. The first well was to intersect the 
blown-out at 18,000 ft below the water’s surface and pump mud and cement to 
completely shut it. The back-up well was to be drilled to take over if the primary well 
failed. The Transocean drilling rig Development Driller III was planned to drill the first 
relief well and the Transocean Development Driller II, the remaining planned relief 
well. On April 28th, the rate of oil leaking from the well was increased and estimated to 
be as much as 5,000 barrels per day. 
 
Meanwhile, responders focused to the release of large amounts of oil. The National 
Contingency Plan requires the Coast Guard to supervise an oil-spill response but it 
does not envision that the Coast Guard will provide even most of the response 
equipment. This role is filled by private oil-spill removal organizations. BP’s main oil-
spill removal organization in the Gulf is the Marine Spill Response Corporation, a non-
profit created by industry after the Exxon Valdez disaster to respond to oil spills which 
dispatched four skimmers within hours of the explosion. However, these Marine Spill 
Response Corporation and other oil-spill removal organizations were soon 
outmatched.  
 
 86 
A week after the rig sank, on April 29th, the US Coast Guard designated the disaster a 
“Spill of National Significance” and it was the first time in the US history that this 
designation was used. This meant that due to its severity, size, location, actual or 
potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, or the 
necessary response effort is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of 
federal, state, local and responsible party resources to contain and clean up the 
discharge.  
 
This designation permitted a National Incident Commander to assume the role of the 
Federal On-Scene Coordinator in some aspects such as communicating with affected 
parties and the public and coordinating federal, state, local and international resources 
at the national level. The National Incident Commander became the face of the federal 
response as he coordinated interagency efforts on the wide variety of issues 
responders faced and dealt with high-level political and media inquiries. However, the 
Federal On-Scene Coordinator generally retained oversight of the day-to-day 
operation. On May 1st, Admiral Thad Allen, the outgoing Commandant of the US Coast 
Guard, was designated as National Incident Commander.  
 
The first relief well’s drilling operations started on May 2nd 2010 and it was estimated 
to take about three months to complete from this date. The Development Driller III rig 
positioned half a mile from where the Deepwater Horizon was located. Deepwater 
containment technology had never been developed. BP embarked on a massive effort 
to generate containment options, either by adapting shallow-water technology to the 
deepwater environment or by designing entirely new devices. Different teams at BP’s 
Houston headquarters focused on different ways to contain the leak, either by 
stopping the flow of oil or by collecting it at the source. 
 
On May 5th, BP halted their efforts to try to shut the BOP by using ROVs as all the 
attempts had failed so far. Later that month, a gamma-ray imaging of the BOP 
indicated that the blind shear rams had closed at least partially when activated by the 
ROVs but oil continued to flow past it. Another of the experimental approaches tried 
by BP was the use of a large pre-existing containment dome, also referred to as a 
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“cofferdam”. The idea was to place it over the largest leak and piping the oil captured 
to the Discoverer Enterprise, a ship on the surface. Nevertheless, this method had 
never been used before in such a considerable depth of water. On 4th May, BP had 
already finished modifying for deep-sea use and oil collection a 40 feet tall, 24 feet 
long and 14 feet wide steel dome. The operation to lower the 98-ton dome began late 
in the evening of the 6th of May. Oil reached the shore the same day, on the 
Chandeleur Islands, close to the Mississippi Delta. 
 
 
The “cofferdam” attempt to contain one of the leaks 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Stopping_the_spill:_the_five-month_effort_to_kill_the_Macondo_well 
 
Gas leaking from the pipe combined with cold water formed methane hydrate crystals 
that blocked the opening at the top of the dome and prevented oil from being 
funnelled to the surface. BP had resources to mitigate this problem once the dome 
was in place, but they had not foreseen this could happen during the installation, 
which took place in the evening of the 7th of May. Because hydrocarbons are lighter 
than water, the dome became buoyant as it was filled with oil and gas and floated up. 
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Another of the factors that affected this effort was the inaccurate estimate of the 
well’s flow, which according to the government’s then-current estimate was 5,000 
barrels per day. The far larger volume of the actual flow may have been part of the 
reason hydrates formed more quickly than expected. The containment dome was 
finally lifted up to the surface on May 10th 2010. 
 
After giving up on the cofferdam, it was deployed a new collection device named the 
Riser Insertion Tube Tool. On May 14th, a small oil riser (4 inch diameter) was tried to 
be inserted down to the end of the original broken riser (21 inch diameter), but one of 
the subsea robots collided with the pipework and the pipe got dislodged. On May 16th, 
a new tube was successfully inserted into the broken pipe. There was a stopper-like 
washer around the small riser that plugged the end of the riser and diverted the flow 
into the insertion tube. Some of the leaking oil (approximately 22,000 barrels of oil per 
day) could be directed to the Discoverer Enterprise on the water’s surface during the 
time it was in use. On the same day, the Development Driller II began the drilling 
operations for the second relief well, which was also estimated to take about 3 months 
from the commencement of drilling. 
 
On May 12th, BP released a 30-second video of oil and gas streaming from the end of 
the broken riser. Within 24 hours, scientists estimated the rate of oil and gas leaking 
ranged from 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. After releasing another video on May 
18th of the leak at the kink and combining the estimated flows from the two sources, 
the rate was established to be at least of 50,000 barrels per day. In order to establish 
an official rate of oil and gas gushing out of the well, the National Incident Command 
created on May 19th an interagency Flow Rate Technical Group, which consisted of 
scientists from USCG, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), US 
Department of Energy (DOE) and outside academics. It was made responsible of 
generating a preliminary flow rate as soon as possible. Their first estimate was 
published on May 27th and it was ranged between 12,000 and 19,000 barrels.  
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TOP KILL AND JUNK SHOT OPERATIONS 
 
After the approval of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, BP started the “top kill” and 
“junk shot” operations to completely stop the flow from the Macondo well in the Gulf 
of Mexico in the afternoon of the 26th of May 2010. A top kill is planned to counteract 
the pressure of hydrocarbons surging upward by injecting heavy drilling fluids through 
the blowout preventer’s choke and kill lines, down into the well. A junk shot 
complements the top kill operation as it involves pumping material such as pieces of 
tire rubber and golf balls, into the bottom of the BOP through the choke and kill lines. 
These materials ideally got caught on obstructions within the BOP and prevent the gas 
and oil from flowing.  
 
 
“Top Kill” operations 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Stopping_the_spill:_the_five-month_effort_to_kill_the_Macondo_well 
 
Both procedures are standard industry techniques for stopping the flow from a blown-
out well, although they had never been used in such deep waters. The Q4000 floating 
rig was brought to place and it controlled the new drill pipe lowered to the wellhead. 
The mud was to be pumped first from the HOS Centreline and if required from three 
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surrounding ships, via the Q4000, down to the manifold, through the blowout 
preventer by the “kill” line and the “choke” line and down the borehole. 
 
Three separate attempts over three consecutive days were done, pumping mud at 
rates exceeding 100,000 barrels per day and firing numerous shots of junk into the 
BOP. At first it seemed the pressure dropped but then flattened, thus indicating that 
the top kill had stopped making progress. After the third unsuccessful attempt, on May 
30th 2010, the efforts to halt the leak using this method were abandoned.  
 
TOP HAT 
 
After trying to contain the well with unsuccessful results, BP and the government 
focused their efforts on trying to collect the oil gushing out of the well, although the 
relief wells were still the best solution for killing the well definitely. Immediately after 
the “Top Kill” operations failed, a new attempt began. The first step on this new plan 
was to cut and remove the damaged riser from the top of the failed Blowout Preventer 
(BOP) to leave a cleanly-cut pipe at the top of the BOP’s LMRP. Afterwards, a collection 
device called “Top Hat” was installed via a new riser to the Discoverer Enterprise. 
 
 
“Top Hat” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2010/may/20/deepwater-horizon-gulf-oil-spill-gulf 
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The installation of the “Top Hat” began on June 1st and it was in place by 23:30 on June 
3rd. To prevent the formation of hydrates, methanol was injected into the containment 
cap. The intention was to capture most of the oil and gas flowing directly from the well 
and channel it to the vessel on the surface. However, 4 vents in the cap allowed about 
half the oil to escape, otherwise the pressure would have broken the seal between the 
cap and the riser. 
 
On June 16th 2010, a supplemental containment system connected directly to the “kill” 
and “choke” lines of the damaged BOP was installed. It channelled oil and gas through 
hoses and a manifold to the Q4000 rig on the surface, where these hydrocarbons (up 
to 10,000 barrels of oil per day) were flared by a specialised clean-burning system 
imported from France. On June 18th, the first relief well had already been drilled to 
16,000 feet and the second was at 9,778 feet. As they got closer to the target, the 
drilling operations became slower because the last thousand feet had to be drilled very 
exactly to intersect the blown-out Macondo well. 
 
CAPPING STACK 
 
Finally, on July 10th the last effort to try to cap completely the well started after the 
approval of the government the day before. Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) 
removed the existing “top hat” in order to replace it with a larger sealing cap, which 
was essentially a smaller version of a BOP, expecting that this new device could control 
all the oil and gas spewing from the well and pump this flow to ships on the surface. 
This new device included “ram” seals that were able to switch off the hydrocarbons 
flow for short periods if hurricanes swept across the Gulf of Mexico, as had happened 
by the end of June with Hurricane Alex.  
 
After removing the old containment cap, ROVs removed the flange on top of the old 
BOP and replaced it with a “transition spool” bolted on the Blow-Out Preventer by 6 
seventeen-inch long bolts, each weighing 23 kg. Then, the cap was lowered on the 
transition spool and sealed into place. The whole process was carried out smoothly, 
without any incident, and it did not finish until July 12th. This new device had been 
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equipped with three ram-type seals that had to be able to shut off the well during 
hurricanes and with multiple ports for connection to additional containment options. 
Although the pipe used to lower the ram had been perforated to allow oil to escape 
and so avoid excessive pressure, once the installation was completed this pipe was 
also closed off. This entire installation was 10 meters high and weighed 72 tonnes.  
 
The next step was to prepare to temporarily close the capping stack in a planned “well 
integrity test” to determine whether the well had been compromised and oil could 
flow into the rock formation. BP had to monitor pressure, sonar, acoustic and visual 
data continuously to ensure oil was not escaping through the rock formation. There 
had been developed some guidelines for the length of the test depending on the 
pressure at shut-in. If pressure increased over 7,500 psi, the risk of a leak through the 
formation rock was low and, therefore, the test could proceed for the full 48 hours. 
The pressure when integrity test started at 14:25 on July 15th was just over 6,600 psi, in 
an uncertain middle range, and slowly rising. 
 
At least, on July 15th 2010, the gush of oil from Macondo’s spewing well in the Gulf of 
Mexico was halted for the first time in 87 days. However, more tests were conducted 
thereafter to make sure the new containment system would hold the well’s flow and 
pressure. No remarkable changes were noticed during this time and until the “static 
kill” operations began. On July 23rd, the drilling operations on the relief wells had to be 
suspended due to the Tropical Storm “Bonnie”. However, the following day, they 
returned to the site to try to finish the work once and for all. 
 
STATIC KILL 
 
The static kill involved pumping heavy drilling mud into the well in order to push oil 
and gas back into the reservoir, similar to the top kill. The difference was that now oil 
and gas were already static and this allowed lower pumping rates for the static kill to 
succeed than the rates required for the top kill. Despite the delays caused by the 
weather and work on the first relief well, the plan for the “static kill” operation was 
approved by the government on August 2nd. The next day, the Q4000 rig started 
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pumping heavy mud from a nearby ship called the “Blue Dolphin”. Mud was pumped 
to the manfold, which had previously been installed on the sea floor, into the kill and 
choke lines and then into the ram stack on the Blowout Preventer. 
 
Pressure began dropping as predicted and by the same August  3rd at 23:00 the static 
kill had succeeded. The following day, the well was monitored to ensure it remained 
static or, on the contrary, it required further mud pumping. Finally, on the evening of 
the 4th of August, Admiral Allen let the mud be followed with cement. On the next day 
the process to pump cement into the blown-out oil well through the drill pipe began 
and did not finish until August 6th. Pressure testing carried out the same day indicated 
that the cement plug had been successful, which also meant that the leak had been 
permanently sealed. 
 
RELIEF WELL 
 
Before intersecting the blown-out well, the failed Deepwater Horizon’s BOP had to be 
replaced by another in better condition, the BOP of the Development Driller II, so to 
prevent any build-up pressure that could occur when the relief well reached its target 
and started pumping cement at the bottom. On September 3rd, the old BOP was 
unlatched and slowly lifted to the surface, where it arrived the next day. The final 
destination for this failed device was a NASA facility in Louisiana, where it was to be 
examined in order to help in the blowout investigation.  
 
On September 16th, the Development Driller III relief well intersected the blown-out 
Macondo well at a depth of 18,000 feet, just above the oil and gas reservoir, and 
pumping of cement to completely seal the well in a process called “bottom kill” 
started. On September 19th 2010, after testing the cement job and the pressure 
downhole, and 152 days after the blow-out, Admiral Allen finally announced: “the 
Macondo 252 well is effectively dead”. The National Incident Command finally stood 
down on October 1st. 
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THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
 
Major accidents are said to be a product of several factors. According to this 
statement, by eliminating only one of the factors the accident should be avoided. The 
main cause of the accident that lead to the explosion, fire and sinking of the 
Deepwater Horizon semisubmersible rig was the uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons 
that escaped from the well reservoir undetected to the surface where the rig stood.  
 
Despite the rig’s final landing position on the ocean floor, which made it very difficult 
for investigators to recover most of the essential information that could help to 
identify the different failures, eight key factors were found that failed in stopping the 
flow that lead to the blow-out, fuelled the fire after the explosion and released almost 
5 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. These eight key factors included not 
only technical failures but also human errors and engineering design decisions.  
 
THE KEY FACTORS 
 
1. THE ANNULUS CEMENT BARRIER 
 
The final production hole section was one of the most difficult to be drilled due to a 
reduction in fracture gradient at the bottom of the wellbore. This required choosing a 
proper mud weight to avoid mud losses into the well and maintain overbalance on the 
formation so that no hydrocarbons could flow into the wellbore. After considering the 
narrow margin between pore pressure and fracture gradient, it was decided that a 9-
7/8 in x 7 in. long string production casing with a lighter-foamed nitrified cement 
would be installed. 
 
The decision of installing a 9-7/8’’ x 7’’ long string production casing has been much 
discussed by experts. The other option was to install a liner in the final hole section 
and then installing a separate “tie-back” casing string between the liner and the 
wellhead, which would provide two extra barriers added to the cement and the casing 
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hanger seal: the liner packer at the top of the liner string and the cement used to settle 
the tieback string into place. However, the long string option saved almost $10 million 
and 3 days of work to BP, although it left a narrower margin for error. 
 
According to the BP investigation team, only limited cement testing was performed on 
the slurry used in the Macondo well before the cement job was carried out Testing for 
some parameters such as fluid loss, free water, foam/spacer/mud compatibility or 
settlement was not included in the report, which resulted in the well designers being 
unaware of some of the risks the use of this particular cement involved. Moreover, 
only 6 centralizers of the 21 planned were used to place the final casing in place. 15 
additional centralizers had been brought to the rig, but the rig crew erroneously 
thought they were of the wrong type. The use of only 6 centralizers increased the 
potential risk of the casing not being well-centred and cement not equally distributed 
around, which could create a potential path for hydrocarbons to flow. 
 
The cement job for the final production casing had been finished at 00:36 on April 20th. 
This cement was pumped down the production casing and up into the wellbore 
annulus. This cement job was thought to prevent hydrocarbons from entering the 
wellbore from the reservoir. The time expected for this particular kind of cement to 
solidify was not less than 48 hours. However, the positive test, the negative test and 
the riser displacement with seawater for temporary abandonment of the well took 
place the same day. It has been stated by many investigators that due to these tests, 
the casing expanded minimally and broke the cement bonds closest to the casing 
creating a “micro-annulus” around the casing, a clear path for hydrocarbons to flow 
freely. However, this problem could have been identified if it had been conducted a 
cement bond log. 
 
2. THE SHOE TRACK BARRIERS 
 
Pressure evaluations carried out after the blow-out, as, for instance, during the static 
kill attempt to seal the well, have found out that hydrocarbons, once in the wellbore, 
entered the 9 – 7/8 in. x 7 in. production casing through the shoe track at the bottom 
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first, instead of through the casing hanger seal assembly at the top or through the 
production casing and components. This happened because both barriers in the shoe 
track failed: the shoe track cement and the double-valve float collar. 
 
 
9-7/8 in. x 7 in. Production String Shoe Track 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf 
 
When hydrocarbons passed through the annulus cement barrier, the cement in the 
shoe track and the check valves or flapper valves in the float collar should have 
prevented them from entering into the 9-7/8 in. x 7 in. production casing. Several 
possibilities have been studied which could explain why the 190-feet shoe track 
cement section failed in its function: because of contamination by the mud in the 
wellbore,  because of inadequate design of shoe track cement, because of swapping of 
the shoe track cement with the mud in the rat hole or because of a combination of 
these factors.  
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The flapper valves of the float collar were designed to prevent backflow or ingress of 
fluids into the casing. As mentioned earlier, nine attempts were required to convert 
the float collar and a final pressure of 3,142 psi, instead of the 500 to 700 psi 
commonly needed. Moreover, to rupture the burst disk of the bottom wiper plug 
2,900 psi were needed, whereas this operation normally requires between 900 to 
1,100 psi. Post blow-out investigations had found very probably that the float collar 
was plugged by wellbore debris. The last attempt to convert it at 3,142 psi had 
probably cleared debris from the system without converting the system. 
 
Post-blowout investigations have reported that the pressure reached during the 
negative test approached but did not reach the required pressure to uplift the casing 
hanger seal assembly, making it impossible for hydrocarbons to flow through. 
However, after a sustained flow, the thermal elongation of the pipe due to the 
temperature increase could have added some uplift force to lift the seal assembly, 
creating an additional flow path. 
 
3. THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE TEST 
 
Ten and a half hours after finishing the cement job, the positive test was carried out. 
Wellbore pressure was increased through the kill line to 250 psi and held for 5 
minutes. Afterwards, the pressure was increased to 2,700 psi and held for 30 minutes. 
Once the positive test was successfully conducted, the negative test was to take place. 
This negative pressure test was carried out to verify the integrity of the mechanical 
barriers such as the shoe track, the production casing and the casing hanger seal 
assembly. The test involved replacing the heavy drilling mud above the cement plug 
setting point with lighter seawater to place the well in a controlled underbalanced 
condition and discover any possible leaks. It was the first time that the hydrostatic 
pressure in the wellbore would be reduced below the reservoir pressure. 
 
The negative test was conducted twice because on the first attempt the pressure 
never reached zero and it was also noticed that the mud level in the riser had dropped 
and, therefore, mud had contaminated the seawater test area. After refilling the riser, 
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it was agreed to conduct another negative test. On this new attempt, the pressure was 
never dropped to zero, meaning that the well was flowing because it could not remain 
static. Furthermore, instead of 3.5 barrels of backflow expected, 15 barrels were 
eventually observed. It was a clear indication that there was a flow path with the 
reservoir through any of the barriers. 
 
However, as no flow was observed through the kill line while the annular preventer 
was closed, this second negative test was deemed successful, although pressure 
readings and volume bled at the time of the test reflected the opposite. As many 
investigators have reported, it is very likely that mud spacer flowed into the narrow kill 
line and blocked the backflow coming from the well. To sum up, the lack of flow from 
what was believed to be an open kill line, coupled with the erroneous explanation for 
the unexpected pressure on the drill pipe, led the rig crew to establish the test had 
been successful, although the 1,400 psi pressure in the drillpipe connected through the 
wellbore to the non-flowing kill line with 0 psi indicated anything was not going well. 
 
4. INFLUX RECOGNISED TOO LATE 
 
During the last steps of a drilling project, it is essentially important to monitor 
continuously parameters such as pressure, fluids returns and flow indicators to detect 
as soon as possible any possible unexpected influx. Once the negative test was 
accepted as successful, the annular preventer was opened to begin displacing the mud 
in the riser with seawater, this increasing wellbore pressure again and placing the well 
in an overbalanced condition. As mud was being displaced with seawater, wellbore 
pressure decreased until it placed the well in an underbalanced state. 
 
Once the well was underbalanced for the second time, hydrocarbons influx resumed 
again through the production casing and the BOP. As more heavy fluids were being 
displaced with lighter seawater and the well was becoming more underbalanced, the 
rate of influx of gas and oil flowing into the wellbore gradually increased. It is very 
likely that activities taking place at the same time such as preparing for setting the 
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cement plug in the casing and transferring the mud to the supply vessel Damon 
Bankston distracted mudloggers from monitoring the well properly. 
 
At 21:08, the spacer reached the top of the riser and pumps were shut down to 
complete the sheen test prior to discharging the spacer to the sea. During the sheen 
test the flow was directed overboard, bypassing the mudlogger’s flow meter and the 
mud pits, making it impossible for the mudlogger to monitor the backflow from the 
well. During the time the pumps were stopped, flow continued and drillpipe pressure 
increased by 246 psi. However, all this data seemed to have gone unnoticed by rig the 
personnel on-duty at that moment. 
 
From 21:14, when seawater pumping resumed again, an unexpected drillpipe pressure 
increase was experienced as well as a higher level of outflow than what was expected. 
This probably was noticed because pumps were shut down again by 21:31. Thereafter, 
drillpipe pressure continued increasing but hydrocarbons did not enter the riser until 
21:38. However, according to the BP post-blowout investigation, real-time data 
permitted to detect an excess of backflow since 20:58, although it seemed to have 
been unnoticed for more than 40 minutes.  
 
5. FAILED WELL CONTROL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
 
When it was realized that hydrocarbons were flowing into the wellbore, the rig crew 
tried to activate the BOP and diverter, routing the fluids to the mud gas separator 
(MGS) system instead of directing them to the 14 in. overboard diverter line. By 
directing hydrocarbons overboard, the majority of gas could have been safely vented 
overboard, there would have been more time to respond and the consequences of the 
accident may have been reduced. The MGS was soon overwhelmed and, as a 
consequence, gas was vented onto the rig floor.  
 
By 21:47, drillpipe pressure increased from 1,200 psi to 5,730 psi, most likely because 
of an attempt by the rig crew to shut the Blow-Out Preventer by activating the Variable 
Bore Rams (VBRs). At 21:49 rig’s power and real-time data were lost followed by two 
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explosions that started a fire that continued until the rig sank. Some attempts were 
made to activate the Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) which did not activate the 
blind shear rams or unlatch the Lower Marine Riser Package from the BOP stack.  
The actions taken by the rig crew to try to stop the kink were lately carried out, mostly 
because the influx was also recognised too late. Moreover, the decision to divert fluids 
to the MGS rather than overboard worsened the situation, as this device was quickly 
overwhelmed and gas flooded the rig floor. The decision to activate first the annular 
preventer and then the variable bore reams was made according to Transocean’s 
protocol for handling well control events.  
 
6. GAS VENTING ONTO THE RIG 
 
The Mud Gas Separator (MGS) is a low-pressure system designed to remove only small 
amounts of gas mixed with mud. When it was realized that the well was flowing, the 
riser was lined up to this device. However, due to the high pressure exerted by 
hydrocarbon gas expansion and acceleration, the MGS became quickly overwhelmed. 
Post-blow out modelling predictions demonstrated it was impossible for the 60 psi-
rated mud gas separator system to hold a flow pressure exceeding 140 psi. 
 
So far, it has not been possible for investigators to determine whether gas vented onto 
the rig from several places, including the 12 in. vent, the 6 in. MGS vacuum line, the 6 
in. MGS bursting disk relief line and the 10 in. mud outlet line to the gumbo box under 
the deck, or only from the 12 in. vent. The night of the 20th of April 2010, the wind was 
calm and it helped gas not to disperse, but to envelope large areas of the rig with 
potential ignition sources within minutes. By directing the flow to the 14 in. starboard 
diverter directly, gas probably wouldn’t have reached critical areas and engines 
wouldn’t have oversped, preventing or delaying the explosion and giving more time to 
the rig personnel to respond against the kick. 
 
 Modelled vapour dispersion acros
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf
 
Vapour Dispersion Case for Diverting to the Starboard Diverter
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_
assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf
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s the drilling rig at 240 seconds after reaching the surface
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7. FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM FAILURE 
 
The fire and gas system detects hydrocarbon gas and initiates visual and audible 
alarms when acceptable limits are exceeded. For some alarms, an automated function 
initiates when hydrocarbon gas is detected beyond acceptable limits. This automated 
function closes the dampers and shuts off the ventilation fans to prevent gas 
ingression to vulnerable locations through the heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
(HVAC) system. 
 
The Deepwater Horizon fire and gas system had 27 combustible gas detectors (CGDs) 
distributed among the Main Deck (13), the Second Deck (5) and the Drill Floor (9). 
Some of these combustible gas detectors were also placed near the supply intakes for 
all the engine rooms, although these CGDs did not have associated automated actions 
to prevent inflammable mixtures’ ingress to the engine room. 
 
Moreover, some areas on the rig are classified, as they have a high probability to 
contain an explosive gas and air mixture. In these areas, electrical equipment must be 
designed so it is not capable of initiating an explosion. As the possibility of 
hydrocarbons being present on the rig before the production phase of a well is low, 
the Deepwater Horizon had only two main electrically classified areas within the rig 
floor and under the deck. If a flammable mixture migrated beyond these areas, the 
potential for ignition would be higher. The latter has been accepted as the most likely 
explanation for gas reaching an ignition source in the Deepwater Horizon.   
 
Post blow-out analyses have reported that the most probably epicentre of the 
explosion was the engine room, which was placed at the starboard aft quadrant of the 
rig. A flammable mixture coming from the MGS system reached large areas of the rig, 
including the engine room through the HVAC intakes. After that, at least one engine 
went into overspeed and became a potential source of ignition. 
 
The Deepwater Horizon engine room HVAC fans and dampers were designed not to 
trip without manual activation, so that false gas-detection trips would not interrupt 
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the power supply to the thrusters, which kept the dynamically-positioned rig on 
station. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Deepwater Horizon safety systems relied 
heavily on manual intervention, which included well control response. The capability of 
the rig crew to respond in a stressed environment, such as in the case of a blow-out, 
limited the reliability of these systems.  
 
8. THE BOP EMERGENCY MODES FAILURE 
 
The BOP has several methods to seal the well in case of an emergency, none of which 
was successful in isolating the wellbore after the blowout. Some of these methods are 
the Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) and the Automated Mode Function (AMF). 
They were not fully independent, and, therefore, a single failure could affect more 
than one emergency method. The last method to try to shut the BOP was by activating 
a single component, the Blind Shear Rams (BSRs), which did not also work in shearing 
the drill pipe and sealing the wellbore. Some of the problems affecting the BOP were 
very probably known by the rig crew but persisted and had a great impact on the 
response actions taken during the accident. 
 
Before the blow-out, an attempt was made by the rig personnel to try to seal the well 
by activating none of the previous mentioned methods but the annular preventer. If 
the annular preventer had fully sealed the well, the rig crew would have had more 
time to respond. Hydraulic analyses of the BOP control system carried out after 
retrieving this device from the ocean floor have demonstrated that, although the 
annular preventer tried to seal the well, the flowing conditions of the well prevented 
the annular preventer from being able to shut the well completely.   
 
The explosions and fire are probably the main explanation to why the Emergency 
Disconnect System (EDS), the first emergency method available to the rig personnel, 
did not seal the wellbore. This method failed to close the blind shear ram and the 
annular preventers and disconnect the Lower Marine Riser Package from the BOP 
stack that connects to the wellhead. Despite the attempt of activating the EDS by a rig 
crew member some minutes after the explosion, the LMRP did not disconnect and 
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hydrocarbons continued flowing, which means that the BSR did not seal. It is very likely 
that due to the explosions and fire, the cables that would have sent a communication 
signal to initiate the EDS were severely damaged by the blast. 
 
The second method, the Automatic Mode Function (AMF) or “Deadman Switch”, had 
to activate the blind shear rams in case of hydraulic pressure, electric power and 
communications loss from the rig to the control pods. However, this system was not 
designed to separate the rig from the well. The required conditions for the AMF to be 
activated were very likely met during the blowout. To initiate and complete the AMF at 
least one operational control pod was necessary, but none of them were in good 
conditions at the time of the accident. 
 
When the BOP was recovered from the ocean floor, the blue and yellow pods were 
tested so to check their AMF functionality. Insufficient charge was found in the 27-volt 
blue control pod AMF batteries and a fault was also discovered in a critical solenoid 
valve in the yellow control pod. Post Blow-Out investigations have reported that these 
control pods failures probably existed long before the accident, what reflects a lack of 
maintenance of this critical equipment. These failures made it impossible for the AMF 
system to be activated and reduce the accident’s consequences. 
 
The last attempts to try to halt the flow of hydrocarbons gushing out of the well prior 
to and after the rig sank were done using remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). These 
robots were planned to activate the autoshear function to seal the well by activating 
the Blind Shear Rams (BSRs). Despite that the autoshear function was reported to have 
been successfully activated, it did not seal the wellbore completely. The BOP hydraulic 
system was found to have six leaks that likely explain why there was insufficient 
hydraulic pressure to halt the spill. All the attempts to activate the BOP were finally 
stopped on May 5th 2010.  
 
 
 Deepwater Horizon's Blow
http://gcaptain.com/tests
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-Out Preventer (BOP) 
-deepwater-horizons-bop/?18804 
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CONSEQUENCES 
 
The Blow-Out of the Macondo well resulted in a major oil spill defined as a “Spill of 
National Significance” by the US government, the first time this denomination was 
used in US history. Oil gushed from the Macondo well onto the Gulf of Mexico until the 
15th of July 2010, when the well was finally capped. The spill affected large areas of the 
Gulf and the US Gulf coastlines of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, 
including some important wildlife areas containing threatened species. 
 
The first consequence of the Blow-Out was the death of eleven workers, whose bodies 
were never found. Jason Anderson (Senior Toolpusher), Dewey Revette (Driller), 
Stephen Curtis (Assistant Driller), Donald Clark (Assistant Driller), Dale Burkeen (Crane 
Operator), Karl Kleppinger (Roughneck), Adam Weise (Roughneck), Shane Roshto 
(Roughneck), Wyatt Kemp (Derrick man), Gordon Jones (Mud engineer) and Blair 
Manuel (Mud Engineer) were the first affected people by the accident and their death 
was maybe one of the worst consequences the blow-out resulted in. 
 
However, many other consequences resulted from the oil spill that started after the rig 
sank, such as the contamination of important natural areas of the Mississippi’s Delta 
and the death of hundreds of wild animals, despite all the efforts to save the largest 
number of them. Moreover, fisheries started to be closed on April 30th 2010 in the 
Louisiana state waters (three miles or less from shore) and continued piece by piece, in 
Alabama, Mississippi and Florida. NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service started by 
closing an area spanning 3% of the Gulf federal fishing zone. At the peak of the 
closures, NOAA prohibited all fishing in almost the 37% of the Gulf zone.   
 
Finally, the last consequence affected the offshore drilling industry. On May 27th, MMS 
issued a six-month moratorium on all drilling at a water depth of more than 500 feet in 
the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. The moratorium was justified as providing 
time for the Commission investigating the accident to do its work and for MMS to 
undertake needed safety reforms. The moratorium took effect on May 30th and halted 
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work on 33 offshore deepwater rigs. On the same May 27th, the head of MMS, 
Elizabeth Birnbaum, resigned. Almost a month later, on June 21st, the Minerals 
Management Service was renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE). 
 
OIL SPILL AND RECOVERY  
 
The oil spill was initially increased by strong southerly winds caused by an impending 
cold front. By April 25th, it covered an area of 580 square miles (1,500 km2) and was 
only 31 miles (50 km) from the ecologically sensitive Chandeleur Islands. Five days 
later, the oil spill was estimated to cover an area of 3,850 square miles (10,000 km2). 
On May 6th the first oil came ashore on the Chandeleur Islands. By June 4th the oil spill 
had landed on 125 miles (201 km) of Louisiana’s coast. Fortunately the oil gushing 
from the Macondo well was a “sweet” crude oil, i.e., it had a low level of sulphurs and 
it evaporated quickly, thus the oil was not as persistent as some other forms of crude 
oil, making it easier to remove by natural, chemical or mechanical means. 
 
Several methods of oil recovering were used during the spill. The most controversial of 
these methods was the appliance of chemical dispersants at the subsea source of the 
spill, on the surface by vessels and support ships working at the well site and aerially to 
disperse oil slicks found more than five nautical miles from the source control effort 
site. The use of chemical dispersants on the surface by vessels, support ships and 
aircrafts began on April 22nd. It was not until May 15th when it was approved to deploy 
dispersants directly at the source of the spill, at 5,000 feet of water depth. The last 
appliance of chemical dispersants was on July 19th 2010, four days after capping the 
well, despite the last sighting of offshore recoverable oil was observed on August 1st.  
 
One of the less effective but the most environmentally respectful method was 
skimming. Skimmer is defined as any mechanical device specifically designed for the 
removal of oil from the surface of the water without altering its physical or chemical 
characteristics. It was conducted offshore near the spill source, near shore and inshore 
at beaches, bays and marshes, using all kind of vessels and systems available to 
 108 
retrieve the oil from the water. Even some fishing vessels were reconverted to carry 
boom and skimmers instead of nets. The effectiveness of skimming relied essentially 
on the type of oil, the condition or maturity of the oil, the oil viscosity, the oil slick 
thickness and the presence of debris, and the environmental conditions including 
wind, wave, current and the current air and sea temperatures. The in-situ burning and 
the skimming also required aircraft surveillance support to spot oil on the water 
surface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Depiction of the types of responses used in the Gulf 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Decision-making_within_the_Unified_Command?topic=64403 
 
Due to the enormous size of the spill, initial skimming assets were not enough to 
contain and collect the surface oil. Between April 28th and July 19th, the Controlled In 
Situ Burn (CISB) Group conducted 411 burns to help eliminate the largest possible 
amount of oil. At the peak of the operations, the CISB was a 264-person group using 43 
vessels and two-twin engine aircraft. Only twice the responders had to intentionally 
extinguish the fire: the first because after more than eleven hours of burning the crew 
began showing fatigue and the second because the fire spilled out of the containment 
 boom and continued to grow in size and intensity, although it took less than 90 
seconds to completely extinguish
burning was on June 18th
removed between 50,000 to 70,000 barrels of oil.
 
According to the US Coast Guard, t
(780,000 m3) of oil after the blowout and until the wel
exceeding the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill 
originate in US-controlled waters and the 1979 Ixtoc I oil spill 
barrels) as the largest spill in the Gulf of Mexico
were recovered directly from the wellhead (17%). A total amount of 246,405 more 
barrels were burned (5%) and skimmers effectively recovered 147,843 barrels (3%). It 
has been also reported that chemicals, 
dispersed a quantity of 394,248 barrels (8%). 
dispersed naturally and 1,232,025 barrels (25%) evaporated. Finally, 
1,281,306 barrels (26%) could
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 The total number of barrels spilled was calculated by the US government using its 
current flow-estimate, which range from 62,200 barrels per day on April 
barrels per day on July 14th
flow rate decreased as the reservoir of hydrocarbons feeding the 
depleted. The US Coast Guard also reported more than 345 
48,200 people participating in the response operations against the oil spill.
than 3,200 vessels of opportunity helped in these operations. 
 
The USCG report of the oil spill response also informs about a total amount of 3.8 
million feet of hard boom and 9.7 million feet of soft bloom deployed to 
oil from reaching farther as well as a total amount of 1.8 million gallons of dispersants 
used both at the source of the spill and at the surface. Even 411 controlled burns were 
conducted to fire the largest possible amount of oil. However, it was not possible to 
prevent oil from contaminating more than 181 miles of shoreline.
 
Estimated Flow Rate for the Deepwater Horizon Spill
Oil Budget Calculator 
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/OilBudgetCalc_Full_HQ
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There was an attempt to keep the oil spill from the wetlands of Louisiana and the 
other affected states by building barrier islands of sand. The construction of these sand 
berms began on June 16th 2010 off the Louisiana Coast. By late October, the state of 
Louisiana had already spent $240 million of the proposed $360 million without and the 
barriers had only captured an estimated 1,000 barrels of oil. On December 16th, the 
berms project was called “underwhelmingly effective, overwhelmingly expensive”, 
although it was admitted that it could help with reversing the erosion effects on the 
coast. 
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DAMAGE TO MARINE AND WILDLIFE HABITATS 
 
Because the oil spewed from a water depth of 5,000 feet, it likely affected corals, fish 
and worms. Also sperm whales dive to this depth and beyond to feed. Higher up the 
water column, sharks, hundreds of fish species, shrimp, jellyfish, sea turtles and 
dolphins can also be encountered in the Gulf of Mexico. Overhead are a multitude of 
seabirds that in turn feed in the ocean and coastal estuaries. Moreover, dozens of bird 
species fly the Mississippi migration route each year and some of these feed on 
estuarine shrimp, fish and crabs.  
 
Due to the enormous quantity of oil spilled, the potential risk of oil affecting several 
species was really high. Additionally, these marine and coastal species are so 
interdependent that a significant effect on any one has the potential to disturb several 
existing populations. Animals could be exposed to oil through ingestion, filtration, 
inhalation, absorption and fouling. Predators may ingest oil while eating other oiled 
organisms or mistaking oil globules for food; filter feeders could ingest minute oil 
particles suspended in water column; surface breathing animals could inhale oily water 
or its fumes; birds are highly vulnerable to having their feathers oiled, reducing their 
ability to properly regulate body temperature; moderate to heavy external oiling of 
animals can inhabit their ability to walk, swim, fly or eat. 
 
Concerns about the potential impact on wildlife from the Deepwater Horizon spill 
began as soon as the first leaks were discovered. These concerns focused mainly on 
marine mammals, the five species of sea turtles, migration birds and 26 endangered 
species (which also include many marine mammals, terrestrial mammals and all of the 
sea turtles species). The main areas the response personnel found problems with were 
communications, training and preparedness, and logistics. Due to the large scale of the 
event, it was a challenge to ensure the information was shared among all the different 
wildlife response teams. Moreover, the wildlife response operations highlighted the 
lack of training and preparedness of some of the pre-existing stranding network 
responders. Finally, the proper distribution of equipment and reporting information to 
individuals also turn into a considerable unexpected logistics challenge. 
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SEA TURTLES, MARINE MAMMALS AND MIGRATON BIRDS 
 
Marine mammals and sea turtles were considered to be stranded if they were found 
dead or in need of assistance (sick, injured, debilitated or in distress) on the beach or in 
U.S. waters. Covering most of the affected U.S. coastline, stranding networks consist of 
different organizations authorized by the NMFS (sea turtles, cetaceans and pinnipeds) 
and USFWS (manatees and sea otters) that respond to reports of stranded animals, 
which are. Moreover, the Deepwater Horizon overlapped in time and space with the 
sea turtle nesting season, which spans from mid-May to the end of August.   
 
Wildlife responders collected 1,149 sea turtles affected by the spill (dead or alive, 
visibly oiled or not) have been captured since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill began. 
Only 469 of the total number of turtles collected could be released at sea. Additionally, 
278 nests were relocated between late June and mid-August to a safer place.The 
transition to the traditional response levels was established to occur 30 days after the 
last oiled turtle was observed in any activity. Stranding response returned to pre-spill 
levels on October 20th 2010. 
 
According to the NOAA Fisheries Services summary report about affected species 
updated to April 2011, 167 dolphins were affected by the spill could also be captured. 
Unfortunately, only 5 of the 13 dolphins captured alive could be released again to the 
Gulf waters. About other cetacean, only 3 were collected although all of them were 
already dead when responders found them. 
 
On April 30th 2010, the recovery of the first oiled bird was reported. According to the 
US Fish and Wildlife Service consolidated report released on April 20th 2011, more than 
8,233 birds were collected in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida and, especially, Louisiana. 
Of those collected, 2,086 could be collected alive and only 1,252 birds could be 
cleaned, rehabilitated and released to the wild. The most-collected bird species were 
the laughing gulls (42%), brown pelicans (12%), northern gannets (8%) and royal terns 
(4%). 
  
 SHORELINE 
 
More than 650 miles of Gulf coastal habitats 
Florida were oiled, of which 130 miles were designated as moderately to heavily oiled. 
Except for tar balls, Deepwater Horizon oil never reached Texas. 
shoreline was either sandy beach or salt marshes, which required very different 
shoreline cleanup methods. Beaches were 
and Florida. Florida’s and Alabama
thus cleaning beaches was a high priority in those communities because of concern of 
the affected beaches would have on tourism, a mainstay of those local economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEEPWATER – The Gulf Oil Disaster and The Future Of Offshore Drilling
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FI
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Sensitive beach areas were also affected, mainly in Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, 
and required no use of mechanical cleaning equipment using. During the summer of 
2010, the temperature exceeded 38º C (about 100º F), making the cleanup works even 
more difficult. The methods used in marshes were vacuuming, sorbent boom and 
absorbent peat. Moreover, the remote locations of marshes implied more challenges, 
such as counteracting heat or getting supplies to these areas. During the summer of 
2010, new plant growth was observed in oiled marshes, what meant that, fortunately, 
oil had not penetrated into the rich, organic soils and inhibited root systems of 
marshes. 
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FISHERIES CLOSURES 
 
Gulf of Mexico is home to crab, shrimp, oyster, and finfish fisheries, all of which were 
affected by the oil. As part of the Deepwater Horizon response effort, both commercial 
and recreational fishing was prohibited in some Gulf areas. The Louisiana Department 
of Wildlife and Fisheries and the Department of Health and Hospitals began closing 
fisheries and oyster grounds in state waters, which extend three miles or less from 
shore, on April 30th. State fishery closures continued piece by piece, beginning on June 
2nd in Alabama, 4th June in Mississippi, and 14th June in Florida. 
 
NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration began conducting flyovers and modeling 
the movement of the oil beginning on April 23rd. NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries 
Service has the legislative authority to close and open federal waters for seafood 
harvesting, while the states have the authority to close and open waters under their 
jurisdiction. Therefore, NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration closed areas in 
anticipation of oil impacts based on trajectory forecasts analyses produced by NOAA’s 
Office of Response and Restoration.  
 
The fishery closures began on May 2nd. Through an emergency rule, NOAA’s National 
Marine Fisheries Service first closed an area spanning approximately 6,817 square 
miles or 3% of the Gulf federal fishing zone. On May 7th, NOAA increased the closed 
area to 4.5% of that zone. NOAA continued to close additional areas during the 
following weeks until June 2nd when, at the peak of the closures, it prohibited all 
fishing in 88,522 square miles (nearly 37%) of the Gulf federal fisheries waters.  
 
The first reopening of 26,388 square miles of federal waters took place on July 22nd, 
2010. Several reopenings took place thereafter. As per April 19th 2011, all the Federal 
waters closed to fishing due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill had already been 
reopened. NOAA developed sampling analyses to test for taint (a petroleum product) 
or Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) through sensory and chemical testing 
which began on April 28th 2010. Until it was demonstrated an area was oil free for 72 
hours, it was not reopened. If all the portion of samples chosen for the sensory testing 
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passed the test, additional samples underwent chemical analysis to determine if 
harmful levels of PAHs were present. If these levels in the seafood did not pose a 
health concern, the site was eligible for reopening.  
 
Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Area Closures due to Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
DATE OF CLOSURE AREA (sq mi) AREA (sq km) 
PERCENT COVERAGEOF 
GULF EEZ 
2
nd
 May 6,817 17,648 2.8 
7
th
 May 10,807 27,989 4.5 
11
th
 May 16,027 41,511 6.6 
12
th
 May 17,651 45,717 7.3 
14
th
 May 19,377 50,187 8.0 
17
th
 May 24,241 62,784 10.0 
18
th
 May 45,728 118,435 18.9 
21
st
 May 48,005 124,333 19.8 
25
th
 May 54,096 140,109 22.4 
28
th
 May 60,683 157,169 25.1 
31
st
 May 61,854 160,200 25.6 
1
st
 June 75,920 196,633 31.4 
2
nd
 June 88,522 229,270 36.6 
4
th
 June 78,182 202,491 32.3 
5
th
 June 78,603 203,582 32.5 
7
th
 June 78,264 202,703 32.3 
16
th
 June 80,806 209,286 33.4 
21
st
 June 86,985 225,290 35.9 
23
rd
 June 78,597 203,564 32.5 
28
th
 June 80,228 207,790 33.2 
4
th
 July 81,181 210,259 33.5 
12
th
 July 84,101 217,821 34.8 
13
th
 July 83,927 217,371 34.7 
22
nd
 July 57,539 149,026 23.8 
10
th
 August 52,395 135,703 21.7 
27
th
 August 48,114 124,614 19.9 
2
nd
 September 43,000 111,369 17.8 
3
rd
 September 39,885 103,303 16.5 
21
st
 September 31,915 82,659 13.2 
1
st
 October 26,287 68,083 10.9 
5
th
 October 23,360 60,502 9.7 
15
th
 October 16,481 42,686 6.8 
22
nd
 October 9,444 24,461 3.9 
15
th
 November 1,041 2,697 0.4 
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Fisheries Closure on 2nd June 2010 
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater_horizon/BP_OilSpill_FisheryClosureMap_060210.pdf 
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DEEPWATER DRILLING MORATORIUM 
 
On May 27th, after 30 days of interagency examination of deepwater drilling 
operations, the MMS issued a six-month moratorium on all drilling at a water depth 
over 500 feet in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. This moratorium was issued 
to give time to the MMS to undertake needed safety reforms and for the Commission 
investigating the accident to do its work. The moratorium took effect on May 30th and 
halted work on 33 offshore deepwater rigs.  
 
After the federal district court in Louisiana ruled that the moratorium violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act and enjoined its continued enforcement, the 
Department of Interior issued a revised moratorium on July 12th, which limited drilling 
based on the equipment a rig used instead of the depth of the wellhead. There was no 
company which could avoid the ban on drilling. This revised moratorium was also 
challenged, but before the district court could rule on this new lawsuit, the 
Department lifted the moratorium on October 12th, seven weeks ahead of its 
scheduled November 30th expiration 
 
On September 30th, some days before lifting the moratorium, the Department issued 
new regulations on topics such as well casing and cementing, blowout preventers, 
safety certification, emergency response and worker training for both shallow and 
deepwater drilling. Due to the time needed to meet them and for the Department to 
verify compliance, these new regulations were deemed a “de facto moratorium”.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
 
Accidents related to drilling operations in deep waters are not too usual and not as 
significant as Deepwater Horizon’s accident. The factors that lead to this particular 
disaster could have been avoided if the proper decisions had been taken at the right 
moment and if all the equipment had been in good condition. Therefore, if only the 
best industry practices and the recommended standards and regulations for drilling 
operations as well as the well design plan had been followed as required, the blow-out 
and subsequent fire would have very likely been counteracted. 
 
KEY FACTORS 
 
One of the most important key factors that lead to the disaster was the fact that the 
cement in the annulus and in the shoe track failed in isolating hydrocarbons, because it 
had been contaminated or displaced by other materials. If the rig crew had allowed the 
nitrogen-foamed cement to settle during the time it required and recognized that 
there were some problems with the negative test that indicated the well was flowing, 
preventing actions could have been made in time.  
 
Moreover, the influx coming from the well could have been detected almost an hour 
before the explosion took place but the excessive number of activities being conducted 
at the same time made kick detection more difficult during riser displacement. At least, 
the rig personnel on duty could have detected that there were some anomalies with 
the pressure and influx readings and stop all operations to ensure the well remained 
safely under control. 
 
Once the influx was recognized, there were some options that could have prevented or 
delayed the explosion and shut in the well. By directing the influx of oil, gas and water 
coming from the well to the 14 in. starboard diverter directly instead of directing it to 
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the MGS, which was not designed to resist such a high pressure, the gas would 
probably not have flooded onto the rig floor and would have given more time to the 
personnel on the rig to respond against the kick.  
 
Finally, the BOP showed a significant lack of maintenance before and after the 
explosions and it failed in sealing the well completely because the yellow and blue 
control pods were not in good condition. However, by triggering the Emergency 
Disconnect System (EDS) prior to the explosion instead of activating the annular 
preventer or the Variable Bore Rams (VBRs) might have shut in the well and limited the 
impact of any explosions and/or blowouts. 
 
The previous factors are all human errors or decisions that favored the disaster. The rig 
was far behind schedule at the time of the explosion and it probably affected the 
proper completion of the well. Moreover, this well had been defined as a “nightmare 
well” because it had been a hassle that did not go as planned. There was plenty of 
opportunity to call Macondo a nightmare well after a hurricane, two different rigs,  18’’ 
casing set 1,000 feet short, a sidetrack, major lost circulation, extra casing strings, cost 
and time overruns and stopping short of the secondary objective, leaving it untested. 
However, no evidence has been found that shows a conscious decision to sacrifice 
safety concerns to save money. 
 
The above mentioned does not mean that many changes are not necessary. The 
Deepwater Horizon was constructed to the 1989 edition of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Code. After an accident 
occurs, there is always the possibility of introducing changes in designing, construction 
and operation that could help in future occasions to avoid the same to happen. In this 
particular case, one of the key factors was that the fire and gas detection system did 
not prevent hydrocarbons from reaching critical areas on the rig because they were 
not designed to response automatically upon hydrocarbons detection.  
 
Thus, the 1989 IMOMODU Code could be amended so it provides a hierarchy of 
recommended automatic and manual emergency shutdown actions following gas 
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detection in vital areas so the fire and gas detection system does not rely so much in 
manual intervention. These amended guidelines should also provide accepted 
approaches for the design and arrangement of the emergency power supply source 
necessary for station keeping in the event of a flammable gas release so it does not 
also interrupt the power supply to the thrusters because of false gas-detection trips. 
 
Survivors have also reported that the platform heated up to unbearable temperatures 
after the explosion occurred. Additionally, the fire burnt some of the lifeboats and life 
rafts and lifeboats available on the rig and some of the survivors jumped into the sea. 
Therefore, some changes could be also introduced in the same Mobile Offshore 
Drilling Unit (MODU) Code in muster and rig evacuating procedures, life-saving 
equipment characteristics and placement and heat protection during evacuation. Also, 
some changes in the MODU Code could be introduced referring to rig and BOP 
inspection conducting as well as BOP maintaining to guarantee a better operational 
condition in all safety devices  placed onboard the rig or under the water surface.   
 
ATTEMPTS TO SEAL THE WELL OFF 
 
It is very likely that the rig sank because of the considerable amount of water it 
embarked during the fire-fighting operations. It is not clear whether the water 
embarked due to openings that already existed on the rig before the explosion or that 
originated because of the fire. However, some amendments in firefighting operations 
could be made such as using foam instead of seawater to try to extinguish such a 
considerable fire.   
 
After the rig sank, the well spilled oil into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days, before it 
could be finally capped. Many different attempts were made during this time to try to 
halt the spill although none of those succeeded, this reflecting a significant lack of 
effective deepwater spill-stopping equipment. More investigations and improvements 
to design more available and effective methods of sealing a blown-out well should be 
conducted so the time required for halting a deepwater spill is reduced.  
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OIL RECOVERY 
 
The Deepwater Horizon’s deepwater oil spill presented some challenges that the oil 
recovery response teams had never faced before. The oil reached the water surface 
and the coastline without considerable difficulty. Fortunately, a great amount of oil 
dispersed by natural means, evaporated or could be directly recovered from the 
wellhead. However, some of the oil was burned or chemically dispersed by airplanes or 
ships on the surface. The skimming method, the most environmentally respectful, was 
the least effective in recovering oil.  
 
The largest and most expensive oil spill recovery operation was developed in the Gulf 
of Mexico to minimize the impact of the accident, which can be considered as an 
important success indeed although it happened in one of the richest and most 
developed countries in the world. Nevertheless, the fact that in-situ burning and 
chemical dispersants were the most effective methods should serve as a turning point 
for governments to encourage investigators to search some other effective and more 
environmentally respectful methods of recovering oil.  
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